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nuclear weapons program. However, as of December 2003, U.S. policies appear to have 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. A LINGERING PROBLEM 
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have created several crises since U.S. satellites 
detected the evidence of suspicious nuclear activities at Yongbyon in the mid-1980s. The 
latest crisis started after the October 2002 bilateral talks in North Korea, during which 
Bush administration officials informed the North Koreans that they knew about North 
Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program. According to the Bush administration, the 
North Koreans admitted their clandestine program during these talks. Although the North 
Koreans denied the Bush administration’s claim, North Korea’s alleged nuclear weapons 
program unleashed a series of events that amounted to a crisis.1 
Announcing that North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program was a 
violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), the Bush administration suspended the implementation of U.S. pledges committed 
in the Agreed Framework.2 In return, North Korea announced that it would reactivate its 
nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspectors, formally withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, and apparently resumed its 
nuclear program. North Korea justifies its actions by citing U.S. non-compliance with its 
commitments pledged in the Agreed Framework as well as claiming that the Bush 
administration has plans for a pre-emptive attack on North Korea. The credibility of these 
justifications, however, is in question.  
North Korea’s motives have been ambiguous since the beginning of its nuclear 
program. The North Koreans, on the one hand, could really feel threatened by U.S. 
policies, therefore, their recent behavior might be a direct reaction to U.S. policies, just as 
they have claimed.3 On the other hand, the North Koreans might want to take advantage 
                                                 
1 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 12, 2003. 
2 The United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994 in Geneva. 
With the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its existing nuclear 
program in return for two new light-water reactors and shipments of heavy fuel oil to meet its energy needs 
until the first new reactor becomes operational. Under U.S. claims on North Korea’s violation, oil 
shipments to North Korea were suspended on November 14, 2002. 
3 KCNA, “Detailed Report Explains NPT Withdrawal,” FBIS Translated Text, Pyongyang, January 
22, 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk012203.html. 
2 
of the crisis to achieve some political and economic objectives, as the Bush 
administration has claimed.4 The shortage of information about North Korea’s decision-
making makes it hard to determine which argument is more plausible. However, clearly 
understanding North Korea’s motives is critical to deal with the North Korean crisis 
effectively. 
This thesis attempts to reduce the uncertainty about North Korea’s real motives 
for developing a nuclear program. It provides an analysis of the objectives behind North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Why do the North Koreans try to obtain nuclear 
weapons? Is it because they feel threatened by the United States or is it because they want 
to realize some political and economic objectives by creating a nuclear crisis? To 
determine North Korea’s underlying motivations, the thesis examines North Korea’s 
nuclear program and U.S. policies since North Korea’s foundation. It evaluates the 
impact of U.S. policies on North Korea’s decisions to initiate, to suspend, and to resume 
its nuclear weapons program. The thesis particularly focuses on the two crises in 1993 
and in 1994, and the third crisis that started in October 2002 to see if North Korea’s 
nuclear behavior is motivated by insecurity or aggressive impulses. 
The findings of the thesis indicates that although North Korea seems to have a 
mix of both motives, insecurity and ambitious thinking, the former appears to have had 
much greater influence on North Korea’s decisions both to start and to maintain its 
nuclear weapons production capability. North Korea has felt insecure since its 
foundation. The North Koreans may have developed other incentives over time; however, 
their primary motive has been insecurity stemming from their perceptions about the 
vulnerability of the regime in the face of U.S. policies. As for the most recent crisis, the 
Bush administration’s policies appear to have provoked the North Koreans to resume 
their plutonium based nuclear weapons program.  
B. CRITICIZED POLICIES AND FRIGHTENING PROSPECTS 
The Bush administration has been frequently criticized for not pursuing a suitable 
policy to handle the North Korean crisis. Some critics even argue that the Bush 
                                                 
4 Kelly, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 12, 2003. 
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administration has had no policy but merely an “attitude” towards North Korea.5 Despite 
several attempts to dissuade North Korea from resuming its nuclear program, no tangible 
progress has been realized as of December 2003. North Korea continues to claim that it 
has serious intentions and sufficient capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It wants the 
United States to agree to bilateral talks, sign a non-aggression pact, normalize relations, 
and lift the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea. The Bush administration rejects 
North Korea’s demands as nuclear blackmail. Considering bilateral talks as appeasement 
or as a reward for bad behavior, the Bush administration wants to solve the problem 
primarily by multilateral diplomacy while also displaying its readiness for military 
options.  
If North Korea achieves a capacity to build its own nuclear weapons arsenal, this 
would have several undesirable consequences for both the United States and world 
security. Even if North Korea does not use nuclear weapons against the United States, it 
can pose a threat to the United States by selling nuclear weapons to other rogue states or 
terrorists. Moreover, a nuclear North Korea would threaten neighboring countries, 
particularly Japan and South Korea. As a result, these countries may decide to develop 
their own nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear North Korea. Such a development would 
seriously damage the nonproliferation regime. Additionally, North Korea’s success in 
obtaining indigenous nuclear weapons might encourage other nuclear aspirants and 
trigger a nuclear arms race in the absence of trust towards the regime. Therefore, an 
unresolved North Korean crisis not only threatens U.S. security and U.S. interests but 
also has the potential of devastating stability and security all over the world. This 
prospect requires the United States to develop urgent and precise policies to handle the 
North Korean crisis. 
C. EXPLANATORY THEORIES 
As one of the important steps towards crafting proper policies, the motives of 
North Korea and the impact of U.S. policies on its decision-making mechanism must be 
examined as precisely as possible. However, because of the absence of real data about 
                                                 
5 During an interview, Donald Gregg, who served as a national security adviser to Vice President 
George H.W. Bush and as U.S. ambassador to South Korea from 1989-1993, said, “the Bush administration 
never had a policy. It has had an attitude – hostility”. The interview is available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gregg.html. 
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how North Koreans perceive the situation and how they make their decisions about 
nuclear weapons, outsiders are usually dependent on assumptions. Policymakers should 
strengthen their assumptions with the help of models that can simulate the reality while 
clearly explaining the motives. For this reason, the thesis uses the “Deterrence” and the 
“Spiral” models, popular concepts in international security studies introduced by Robert 
Jervis, as the methodology to better understand North Korea’s real motives.  
1. The Deterrence Model  
The deterrence model helps to explain the motives behind the behaviors of a state 
that pursues aggressive policies to secure its national interests. The theory also describes 
the proper course of action that other states should take to keep the aggressor under 
control. The theory suggests that an aggressor state tests the other state to see if it will 
make concessions in order to maintain the status quo. If the aggressor feels that the other 
state tends to compromise, it perceives this as a weakness and takes advantage of it to 
obtain more gain from the other side. As long as the aggressor believes the other state is 
ready for further concessions, it refuses to accept any compromise that falls short of its 
ultimate ambitions.6 
Robert Jervis illustrates the theory by citing a game known as “chicken.” In this 
game, two assertive people, who are usually young and willing to demonstrate their 
courage by challenging each other, drive their cars with high speed toward each other 
expecting that the other would clear the road before a collision. The one who leaves the 
competition first is called a “chicken,” which refers to cowardice. Both sides try to 
understand if the other side would give up first. If one side looks weak and ready to leave 
the road to avoid a collision, the other one takes advantage of it. Perceived or actual 
weakness of one side would be a good motive for the other side to insist on staying on the 
road even though it would mean risking dangerous consequences. Therefore, a player 
seeking to deter a challenger should demonstrate absolute determination in maintaining 
its course since a rational rival that sees the resolve of the other side would not risk a 
collision. 
                                                 
6 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, the Spiral Model and the Intentions of the Adversary,” Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58-60.  
5 
Jervis writes, “Great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo 
powers are weak in capability or resolve.”7 The aggressor tends to resist until the point 
that it feels there would be no further retreat from the other side. But, in the mean time, 
the aggressor might have passed the threshold and face a real conflict. In order to avoid a 
real conflict, the status quo power must often go to extremes because the aggressor may 
take moderation and conciliation for weakness. The status quo power must display the 
ability and willingness to risk war in order to avoid a war. That does not mean that the 
status quo power should never change its position.8 As Jervis concludes, “But while 
carrots as well as sticks are to be employed the other’s friendship cannot be won by 
unnecessary concessions.” 9 
On the other hand, a state that is aware of the theory might fear that concession 
provides the aggressor with an opportunity to exploit, and abstain from cooperative 
policies that might end a conflict. Therefore, the state should be able to recognize the 
circumstances that will encourage the aggressor to cooperate.  Jervis argues, “if the 
distribution of power is favorable, the cost of war, the lower probability of winning, and 
the fear to lose what has already been won, will discourage the aggressor to go further.”10 
2. The Spiral Model 
The spiral model suggests that if one state seeks its own security, it tries to 
increase its ability to defend itself. When states increase their ability to defend 
themselves, they also gain the ability to threaten others. In other words, as Jervis 
explains, “What one state regards as insurance, the adversary will see as encirclement.”11 
Therefore, attempts to increase its own security by a state may be perceived as aggression 
by the others, so this compels them to be more prepared against the first state’s possible 
attacks. In order to reduce the first state’s security, they will increase their own arms 
forcing the first state to seek more power to defend itself against more threatening 
                                                 
7 Jervis, Deterrence, the Spiral Model and the Intentions of the Adversary, 58. 
8 Ibid., 58-60. 
9 Ibid., 60. 
10 Ibid., 60. 
11 Ibid., 64. 
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adversaries. This creates a vicious spiral in which states’ security interests are mutually 
threatened by each other’s self-protection aspirations. 
This model gets its roots from the point of view of the critics of deterrence theory 
stating that the world is anarchic, that is, there is no central authority. In a world without 
a sovereign, each state must defend its own interests.12 In this process, political decision 
makers, especially military leaders, worry that their adversaries may develop aggressive 
intentions. They usually tend to prepare for the worst-case scenario and get ready to 
defend the country against every possible threat even when no actual threat exists.  
Because of the high cost of underestimating the enemy, strategists often consider 
exaggerating the threat to be better than underestimating the threat. Accordingly, as Jervis 
stated, “In extreme cases, states that seek security may believe that the best way for self-
protection is to attack and expand.”13 That is, the Spiral model, which is also called “the 
vicious circle of security dilemma,” can trigger a war even when neither side has 
aggressive ambitions. Jervis argues, “even a state fully satisfied with the status quo may 
start a war if it believes that striking first will have a decisive advantage because of the 
strategy or advanced technology.”14 
The security dilemma often leads to arms races or war. For that reason, if states 
think and act with pessimistic perceptions of the threat and get caught in the vicious 
circle of the security dilemma, they will all develop competitive policies that would 
threaten, as well as, weaken each other. In this case, all states are worse off than they 
would be if they had cooperated. Jervis proposes, “States must employ and develop 
ingenuity, trust, and institutions if they are to develop their common interests without 
undue risks to their security.”15 
Charles L. Glaser, on the other hand, argues that the deterrence and the spiral 
models are inadequate to explain real cases since a state can be both insecure and greedy 
at the same time. Glaser also claims that it is hard to control such states by either 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 63-65. 
13 Ibid., 63. 
14 Ibid., 67. 
15 Ibid., 67. 
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cooperative or competitive policies.16 Indeed, a state can have a mix of motives. North 
Korea, for example displays the characteristics of both aggressiveness and insecurity, 
making it hard to determine North Korea’s real motives and to craft a proper policy. 
Although Glaser’s approach provides a more realistic analysis, Jervis’ models are still 
more helpful in assuming the motives of North Koreans and in illuminating the impact of 
U.S. policies on their decision-making since the indicators are more recognizable and 
distinguishable. Although a state can have mixed motives, it is likely to be either more 
aggressive or more insecure, and not both equally. Recognizing the indicators provided 
by the models in the North Korean case help assume North Korea’s primary motive. 
Applying the models to the North Korean case also improves the ability to predict the 
impact of the U.S. policies and to determine if a policy change is needed.  
D. DISTINGUISHING AN INSECURE STATE FROM AN AGGRESSOR 
 
The Aggressor State The Status Quo Power 
action: arming  
purpose: to maximize own interest 
   reaction : deterrence  
   purpose: to maintain status quo  
    
reaction: compromise 
outcome: aggressor exploits  
 
action: testing the status quo power 
for compromise 
 reaction: no compromise 
outcome (1): aggressor retreats—no war 
outcome (2): aggressor fails to recognize the 
resolve—war 
Table 1. Behaviors of States in the Deterrence Model (The Game of Chicken).  
 
                                                 
16 Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral 
and Deterrence Models,” World Politics, vol.44, no.4, July 1992.  
 
8 
The importance of models comes from their ability to illustrate how aggressive 
and insecure states behave in certain circumstances. For example, if a state tries to exploit 
other side’s concessions although its security concerns are addressed, and if it shows 
restraint when it feels there would be no further retreat from the other side, this state 
should be considered an aggressor as explained in the deterrence model (Table 1). The 
aggressor state perceives cooperative policies as weakness; therefore, the status quo 
power should display strong resolve to stop the aggressor and to avoid a war. 
 
The Status Quo Power The Insecure State 
action : arming 
purpose: to increase own security  
perception: increase in threat   
 
perception: aggression 
reaction (1): more arming, deterrence 
outcome: insecure states continues arming, 
arms race 
reaction (2): preemption  
outcome: insecure states retaliates, war 
perception : the opponent is insecure 
reaction: cooperation 
outcome: insecure state positively responds 
    action: arming 
    purpose: to increase own security 
 
Table 2. Behaviors of States in the Spiral Model (The Security Dilemma). 
 
On the other hand, if a state escalates tensions and resorts to arming when it 
perceives a threat from the others side but positively responds to the other side’s 
concessions that would address its security concerns, then it should not be regarded as an 
aggressor. This state’s real motive, in fact, should be considered insecurity as the spiral 
model suggests (Table 2). If the status quo power fails to understand this state’s real 
motive because of distrust or lack of information, and if it pursues uncooperative policies 
9 
against the insecure states, then an arms race may start. If the status quo power 
misperceives the case and relies on deterrence, rather than cooperation, the outcome may 
be a war.  
The findings of this thesis indicate that North Korea resists any U.S. compromise 
that falls short of its political and economic demands and waits until it feels that no 
further concession would be given by the United States. However, North Korea’s 
demands do not look like expansionist ambitions and the North Koreans seem to be 
demanding compensation of their loss because of U.S. policies. For example, in the crisis 
that started in October 2002, they did not appear to be requesting further concessions 
from the United States; on the contrary, they simply demanded what the United States 
had previously promised. Moreover, it is certain that they were afraid of the United 
States, but it is not clear if North Koreans retreated because of U.S. resolve. Therefore, 
although there is some evidence supporting the deterrence model, it does not 
satisfactorily explain the interactions between the United States and North Korea. On the 
other hand, the findings of the thesis indicate that North Korea has responded to U.S. 
cooperation by restricting its nuclear weapons production capability; however it has 
reacted to U.S. security driven actions by resuming its capability. From this perspective, 
concluding that North Korea is an insecure state seems more plausible. Therefore, the 
spiral model better explains the strategic interactions between the United States and 
North Korea. 
E. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
The thesis applies the deterrence and the spiral models to the interactions between 
the United States and North Korea in a historical context beginning from the foundation 
of North Korea. Chapter II examines the initial phases of North Korea’s nuclear program 
from the 1950s to the late 1980s. It examines why and how North Korea started its 
nuclear program. Although nuclear weapons were not actually used during the Korean 
War, the United States made several nuclear threats at that time. Additionally, the United 
States deployed tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea after the war. The U.S. nuclear 
threats, apparently, worried North Koreans in regards to the survival of their regime. 
Consequently, North Korea initiated its nuclear program in 1960s with the help of the 
10 
Soviet Union and China, and achieved a remarkable progress towards producing its own 
nuclear weapons in 1980s. The interactions between the two states in this period mostly 
resemble the spiral model. North Korea perceived the defensive military measures of the 
United States and South Korea as a direct threat to its existence and decided to equalize 
the power balance with the help of nuclear weapons. When the United States decided to 
remove its tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula, as explained in Chapter 
III, North Korea positively responded to the U.S. concession and agreed to IAEA 
inspections.  
Chapter III covers the time period from North Korea’s entrance to the 
nonproliferation regime, and it focuses on the two crises that were unleashed during the 
Clinton administration period. North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) in 1985 and agreed to inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in 1992. However, it resisted IAEA inspections and threatened to withdraw from 
the NPT in 1993. Moreover, it removed more than half of the spent fuel rods from a 
reactor under the IAEA safeguards in 1994 without the supervision of the IAEA. The 
Clinton administration tried both diplomacy and coercion to solve the North Korean 
problem. It came to the brink of war, then decided to cooperate with North Korea and 
succeeded, to some degree, in restricting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In this 
period, North Korea tried to justify its actions by complaining about U.S. manipulation of 
IAEA inspections. North Koreans were apparently disappointed by the NPT since it was 
not strengthening their security; instead it was threatening their sovereignty. Therefore, 
although North Korea appeared to be cheating the nonproliferation regime, the spiral 
model can better explain North Korea’s behavior since they were mostly defensive 
reactions stemming from perceptions about the threat against the regime. North Korea’s 
positive response to the Clinton administration’s cooperative policies also supports this 
claim. The crisis ended with the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994. 
The implementation of the agreement was very slow because of the failures of 
both sides. The agreement was prone to misinterpretation and both sides had different 
expectations about what the other side was supposed to do. Moreover, the Clinton 
administration faced policy problems in convincing the Congress to provide enough 
money for the commitments under the Agreed Framework. As a final point, the United 
11 
States never provided the security assurance pledged in the agreement. Apparently 
because of dissatisfaction with U.S. performance and because of suspicion about 
continuing cooperative U.S. policies, North Korea decided to start and maintain a covert 
uranium enrichment program, which would create another crisis as explained in Chapter 
IV. 
Chapter IV focuses on the Bush administration’s approach towards North Korea. 
Some officials in the Bush administration had already opposed the Clinton 
administration’s engagement policy and regarded the agreement as appeasement. When 
these officials assumed their position in the government, they made it clear that they 
would make changes in the policy towards North Korea. According to the Bush 
administration, the United States tried negotiating before, but North Korea responded by 
deceiving the United States. In response, Bush officials adopted a position that North 
Korea must first verifiably eliminate its nuclear weapons programs before the United 
States would engage in any cooperative policies.  
After accusing North Korea of its clandestine nuclear weapons program, the Bush 
administration has repeatedly declared its intention to solve the crisis with multilateral 
diplomacy, on the one hand, and deployed long-range bombers to Guam to reinforce the 
U.S. deterrent posture, on the other hand. After several attempts, the United States 
succeeded in getting North Korea to agree to a trilateral meeting in April 2003 and six-
country talks in August 2003 in Beijing. However, no progress has been achieved as of 
December 2003 in terms of convincing North Koreans to quit their nuclear weapons 
program. The U.S. decision to use military options in Iraq while resorting to diplomacy in 
North Korea apparently has damaged the U.S. image of resolve in the eyes of North 
Koreans and has given them the opportunity to insist on their political and economic 
objectives before giving up the nuclear weapons program. North Korea’s behavior, on the 
other hand, is prone to be interpreted as ambitious since it tries to link its political and 
economic goals to its security concern. Thus, although its primary concern is to get a 
security guarantee from the United States, many Americans perceive North Korea as a 
greedy state.  
12 
Chapter V concludes with the findings of the thesis, indicating that the spiral 
model better explains what has been happening between the United States and North 
Korea. Mutual distrust and insecurity has had a great impact on the strategic interactions 
between the United States and North Korea. Both states are mutually threatened by each 
other’s self-protection aspirations. Both sides would be better off if they could cooperate. 
However, mutual distrust, which has been established since the beginning of relations, 
avoids real cooperation between the two states. U.S. intention to achieve a 
comprehensive package deal before providing a tangible security assurance to North 
Korea appear to increase North Korea’s resistance to full cooperation. Therefore, the 
United States should restrain its expectations from North Korea. It should focus on the 
most imminent problem—North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and address North 
Korea’s primary motivation behind this program. The United States should also seek 
ways to convince North Korea to give up its desire to solve all its problems with the help 




















II. INITIAL MOTIVES FOR NUCLEAR POWER  
A. INTRODUCTION 
North Korea initiated its nuclear program in the 1960s. Until the late 1970s, North 
Korea appeared to be aiming at a peaceful energy program. However, U.S. satellites 
detected evidence of North Korea’s secret intentions for producing nuclear weapons in 
the 1980s. Further findings strengthened the suspicion that North Korea was developing a 
capability to produce its own nuclear weapons.  
This chapter examines why and how North Korea started its nuclear program and 
serves as a basis supporting the ideas presented in the rest of the thesis. It questions North 
Korea’s primary purpose for initiating its nuclear program: Did North Korea want to have 
a nuclear source to meet its energy needs or did it plan to take advantage of the nuclear 
energy program as a cover to produce nuclear weapons secretly? If North Koreans aimed 
at the latter from the very beginning, then what drove them to do so? Since the thesis 
seeks to understand the crisis that started in October 2002, this chapter briefly touches 
upon North Korea’s history and provides the milestones of its nuclear program that will 
be useful in following chapters.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1. A Divided Country 
Although the Korean peninsula had been invaded hundreds of times in its long 
history, it had remained a unified country until its partition into two temporary influence 
zones after World War II. During the last days of the war, the Soviet Union declared war 
on Japan and invaded Manchuria and northern Korea, which was then under Japanese 
occupation. Concerned about the possible future implications of Russian invasion, the 
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United States decided to occupy southern Korea and designated the 38th parallel as the 
separation line between the temporary Soviet and American zones.17 
After failing to agree on the conditions of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, 
the Soviet Union and the United States allowed two hostile regimes to be established in 
1948 in accordance with their Cold War policies. A communist government, Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), was founded in the North, and an anti-communist 
government, Republic of Korea (ROK), was founded in the South. Both regimes claimed 
to be the legitimate authority of the entire peninsula causing serious conflicts and a 
struggle for military superiority.  
2. The Korean War and the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons 
The Soviet Union and the United States withdrew their forces from Korea in late 
1948 and in early 1949 respectively; however, the problems between the North and the 
South remained unresolved. In 1950, the North launched a surprise attack across the 38th 
parallel and invaded the South to reunify the Korean peninsula by force. An international 
force led by the United States repelled the North Korean army; however, Chinese 
intervention on the side of the North caused a stalemate introducing the possibility of a 
bigger war.  
Realizing the risks of widening the war, the U.S. generals commanding the 
international force planned to use nuclear weapons in discouraging Chinese aggression. 
General Douglas MacArtur requested several atom bombs to use and his successor, 
General Matthew Ridgeway, repeated the request.18 Additionally, the U.S. 
administrations, which took office during the Korean War, hinted about using atom 
bombs to avoid widening the war and to accelerate the armistice negotiations. After long 
negotiations, an armistice was agreed upon in 1953 and the demilitarized zone (DMZ), 
which has been separating the two Korean states since then, was established. According 
                                                 
17 General information on the history of North Korea and its nuclear program in this chapter is derived 
from: William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World: An International History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Basic Books, 2001), 
Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1995), Leon Sigal, Disarming the Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” 
International Security, vol. 13, no. 3 (Winter1988-1989). 
18 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 252. 
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to Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “[U.S. nuclear] threats were instrumental in bringing about the 
1953 armistice agreement.”19 However, not all agree on the impact of U.S. nuclear 
threats in ending the war. 20 
Mutual hostilities and threats continued after the Korean War. The United States 
supported the South, maintained its military presence there, and deployed tactical nuclear 
weapons to deter the North. Beginning in the late 1950s, the United States deployed 
approximately 950 nuclear warheads of eight types to South Korea up until the 1970s. 
The U.S. nuclear arsenal in South Korea included Honest John surface-to-surface 
missiles, 280-millimeter guns, 8-inch artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions 
(ADMs), gravity bombs for aircraft, Lacrosse and Sergeant ballistic missiles, Nike 
Hercules surface-to-air missiles, Davy Crockett nuclear bazookas, and 155-millimeter 
artillery shells.21 South Korea might have regarded the U.S. military presence and nuclear 
weapons as insurance against North Korea’s possible attacks; but, North Korea perceived 
them as a threat.22 According to North Koreans, the United States turned South Korea 
into “literally the biggest U.S. nuclear weapons exhibition hall” by pursuing a “neither 
confirm nor deny” nuclear policy.23 
After the Vietnam War, the United States decided to lessen its involvement in 
Asian affairs and planned to reduce its military presence in South Korea. The U.S. efforts 
to decrease the number of troops worried South Koreans and increased their efforts to be 
militarily self-reliant. In this vein, South Korea started to modernize its army and 
developed a secret plan to establish an indigenous nuclear weapons arsenal.24 The United 
                                                 
19 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional 
Weapons,” Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
Weapons, Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz eds. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2000), 185. 
20 Don Oberdorfor argues that although the Eisenhower administration claimed that the nuclear 
weapons played a major role in ending the war, recent evidences from Soviet archives made these 
allegations suspicious. (Oberdorfor, The Two Koreas, 252.) 
21 “North Korea’s nuclear program, 2003” in Nuclear Notebook 2003, Robert S. Norris, Hans M. 
Kristensen, and Joshua Handler eds., Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2003, Vol. 59, No.2, 
74–77. 
22 Sigal, Disarming the Strangers, 21. 
23 KCNA’s Detailed Report on Failure of Denuclearization, May 12, 2003, FBIS translated text, 
available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html, accessed on September 14, 2003. 
24 Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, 26. 
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States tried to discourage South Korea; nonetheless, U.S. efforts proved ineffective. The 
Carter administration had to offer more reassurance, cancel troop withdrawal, and 
reaffirm the U.S. nuclear commitment to stop South Korea from developing an 
independent nuclear deterrent.25 
3. Search for More Power  
In the face of what could be perceived as a growing threat from the South, the 
North devoted its scarce resources to building a huge conventional army. North Korea 
also tried to get support from its powerful neighbors, the Soviet Union and China; 
however, dependence on its neighbors’ power proved unreliable over time. The wobbling 
relations with China and the Soviet Union caused North Korea to prefer building military 
forces of its own without depending on the military forces of other countries. Thus, North 
Korea adopted the concept of juche, or self-reliance, and its military component of jawi, 
the principle of military self-defense.26 North Korea initiated a massive military 
reorganization and modernization program that included the development of chemical 
and biological weapons. North Koreans initially considered its chemical weapons to be 
sufficient to deter the United States; however, they later realized that the United States 
was unaware of North Korea’s unconventional capability.27 Meanwhile, South Korea 
made remarkable progress in building a modern army with the help of the United States. 
North Korea’s growing concern about its security compelled it to look for a reliable 
security guarantee and resulted in North Korea’s nuclear program. 
North Korea’s search for nuclear power started with its efforts to obtain nuclear 
assistance from the Soviet Union and China in 1960s. Regarding Soviet and Chinese help 
to North Korea, Leon V. Sigal argues, “Although the Soviet Union and China did not 
provide North Korea the bomb-making technology it needed, they did not do enough to 
restrain their client either.”28 The Soviets responded to North Korea’s request positively; 
nevertheless, they offered limited nuclear energy assistance. China provided limited help 
on nuclear research as well.  
                                                 
25 Sigal, Disarming the Stranger, 20. 
26 Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, 22-24. 
27 Bermudez, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons,” 185-186.  
28 Sigal, Disarming the Strangers, 20. 
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North Korea and the Soviet Union signed two agreements on nuclear research. As 
a result, North Korean scientists were trained in Russia, and with the Soviets’ help a 
nuclear research center was established at Yongbyon, sixty miles from North Korea’s 
capital Pyongyang, in 1964. The Soviets also helped North Korea build a small 
experimental nuclear reactor in 1965 at the same center. By these means, North Korea 
obtained graphite reactor technology that enables producing fissionable plutonium, which 
could be used for producing nuclear weapons. Since the Soviet Union insisted to keep its 
assistance limited to peaceful nuclear energy purposes, the research reactor at Yongbyon 
was placed under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
although North Korea was not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).29  
After China accomplished its first nuclear test in 1964, North Korea attempted to 
benefit from Chinese experience. However, China rejected North Korea’s request to 
share nuclear weapons information. According to Don Oberdorfer, the Chinese leader 
Mao Zedong thought that nuclear weapons were not necessary for North Korea since it 
was a very small country. North Korea renewed its request in 1974, but China rejected it 
again. 30 However, China provided some assistance on nuclear research like the Soviet 
Union.31  
4. Detection of North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions 
During the 1970s and 1980s North Korea continued to develop its nuclear 
program. According to Bermudez, North Korean leaders decided to transform their 
nuclear research program into a weapons program in the mid-1970s in the face of U.S. 
threats and revelations about the South Korea’s covert nuclear weapons program.32 In the 
early 1980s, U.S. satellites detected a suspicious construction at Yongbyon. The 
construction later turned out to be a nuclear reactor. This was the second nuclear reactor 
at Yongbyon together with the small research reactor North Korea had obtained from the 
                                                 
29 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 252. 
30 Ibid., 253. 
31 Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, 25. 
32 Bermudez, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons,”188. 
18 
Soviet Union in 1965. The reactor was not attached to any power grid, meaning it was not 
plausibly intended for electricity generation; as a result, this raised questions about its 
purpose.33  
In 1985, North Korea began construction of a 50-MWe (megawatts of electrical 
output) reactor at Yongbyon and later a 200 MWe reactor at Taechon. In 1986, U.S. 
satellites discovered cylindrical craters, which were believed to be the traces of 
experimental high-explosive detonations.34 In 1988, a very large building under 
construction at Yongbyon was detected. This building was later concluded to be a 
plutonium reprocessing plant. The purpose of reprocessing is to separate plutonium from 
uranium fuel rods that are spent in nuclear reactors. Plutonium, then, can be used to 
produce nuclear weapons. According to Sigal, “When fully operational, the plant was 
assessed to have the capacity to reprocess spent fuel from all three North Korean 
reactors--yielding 30 bombs worth of plutonium a year.”35 Detection of the constructions 
of the reactors together with the reprocessing plant and other evidence indicated that 
North Korea had presumably started a secret nuclear weapons program in late 1970s.36  
C. ANALYSIS: THE DETERRENCE OR THE SPIRAL MODEL 
Although nuclear weapons were never used in the Korean War, the U.S. nuclear 
diplomacy at that time apparently had a significant impact on North Korea’s decision to 
search for nuclear power. According to Roger Dingman, nuclear weapons, as a 
diplomacy tool, were applied “…ranging from verbal mention of nuclear potential only; 
through deployment of nuclear-configured bombers and non-nuclear weapons 
components and indirect disclosure of their movement; to deployment of bombers and 
bombs along with fuller, but still indirect, revelation of their departure from the United 
States.”37 The North Koreans later stressed that, “Eisenhower hatched 22 plots to use 
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atomic weapons against the DPRK and other socialist countries.”38 As another factor to 
increase North Korea’s insecurity, the U.S. adopted the massive retaliation nuclear 
strategy at that time, which favored severe nuclear punishment as a response to any 
significant Communist provocation, even a limited one.39 Implied and direct nuclear 
threats during the Korean War and the massive retaliation strategy might have convinced 
North Koreans that the use of nuclear weapons by the United States was very possible.  
The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea constituted a 
significant source of insecurity for North Koreans. They claim that the United States 
started the nuclear issue by deploying the Honest John nuclear missiles in the latter half 
of the 1950s.40 The United States increased North Korea’s level of threat perception by 
deploying several neutron bombs in the first half of the 1980s. Additionally South Korea 
started a nuclear program in the 1970s, which was called the Yusin regime, and, 
according to the North Koreans, obtained a capability of annually extracting enough 
plutonium for 23 to 28 nuclear bombs of 20 kilotons.41 The North Koreans perceived the 
nuclear threat posed by the U.S. nuclear weapons and South Korea’s nuclear capability as 
“a crucial issue related to the survival of the nation.”42 
In the face of the U.S. nuclear threats during and after the Korean War, North 
Koreans bitterly realized their weakness against nuclear weapons. Vulnerability of its 
own security was, therefore, the primary cause for North Korea to start its nuclear 
program. Given the U.S. nuclear threats during and after the Korean War, North Korea 
apparently sought a counterbalance and a credible deterrent to secure its regime. 
North Korea's motives might have evolved overtime.43 Mazarr argues that North 
Korea developed secondary motives. They wanted nuclear weapons to have an insurance 
against an eventual South Korean conventional superiority; to obtain diplomatic leverage;                                                  
38 “Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Nuclear Strategy for Aggression,” Korean Central News Agency, 16 
March 2002, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm, / Past News, last accessed on 14 October 
2003. 
39 Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, 20. 
40 KCNA’s Detailed Report on Failure of Denuclearization, May 12, 2003, FBIS translated text, 
available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html, accessed on September 14, 2003. 
41 Cited in KCNA’s Detailed Report on Failure of Denuclearization. 
42 KCNA’s Detailed Report on Failure of Denuclearization. 
43 Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, 16-17. 
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to force the world to take notice of their concerns; to promote direct, bilateral talks with 
the United States; to promote scientific achievement and international recognition, thus 
bolstering the regime’s legitimacy; and to reduce its dependence on China and Russia so 
as to increase its freedom of independent action.44 However, their concern about the 
regime has always remained at the center of all motives. According to Mazarr, “First and 
most fundamentally, the North wanted a nuclear arsenal to deter U.S. nuclear use and to 
counterbalance the U.S. nuclear umbrella that protects the South.”45 The North Koreans 
considered their lack of nuclear capabilities to be a potentially fatal weakness in the face 
of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that protects the South.46 The desire to protect the regime 
required North Korean leaders to search for a reliable security guarantee. 
North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950 and continued to pose a threat as an 
aggressive state after the war. However, its search for nuclear power was not an 
aggressive act; it was a reflex to counterbalance U.S. nuclear threats. If the United States 
had not implied the use of nuclear weapons during the Korean War and had not deployed 
nuclear weapons to South Korea, North Korean leaders probably would not have sought 
nuclear weapons. Instead, they would have continued to strengthen their conventional 
forces to implement their ambitious goal to reunite the Korean peninsula by force. Thus, 
although North Koreans had aggressive goals, the motives behind their search for nuclear 
weapons primarily stemmed from insecurity in the face of perceived U.S. nuclear threats 
towards their existence. Thus, the Spiral Model better explains North Korea’s reasoning. 
U.S. efforts to secure its interests in the Korean peninsula caused a weak regime to seek a 
reliable security guarantee for survival. The threat coming from U.S. nuclear weapons, 
U.S. support to South Korea, South Korea’s relative military superiority, and South 
Korea’s own nuclear program in combination left North Koreans worried about their 
existence.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The roots of North Korea’s search for nuclear power can be traced back to the 
Korean War. Appreciating the political value of nuclear weapons during the Korean War 
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and seeing their weakness against U.S. tactical weapons deployed to South Korea, North 
Koreans wanted a credible deterrent and initiated the nuclear program to produce their 
nuclear weapons eventually. North Koreans headed for nuclear weapons from the very 
beginning. The initial motive for nuclear weapons emerged as a reaction to protect the 
regime against perceived U.S. threats. North Korea continuously considered nuclear 
weapons as a security guarantee for the survival of the regime and maintained its nuclear 












































III. THE 1993-1994 CRISES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the U.S.-North Korean interactions during the Clinton 
administration period focusing on the two crises in 1993 and 1994. It assesses North 
Korea’s motives for causing nuclear crises and the Clinton administration’s reasons for 
relying mostly on diplomacy during this period. The chapter shows how North Korea 
behaved when it felt threatened and how it responded when its concerns were addressed. 
Understanding North Korea’s behavior and the Clinton administration’s approach during 
the first two nuclear crises will help in the following chapter see if the Bush 
administration has legitimate grounds to complain about North Korea’s unreliability and 
to pursue tougher policies during the third nuclear crisis. 
North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 and 
agreed to inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992. When 
the IAEA detected evidence of a secret nuclear weapons program, North Korea 
encountered massive pressure for further inspections. Irritated by the IAEA inspections 
and angry with the reinstatement of joint U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit military  
exercises, North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993. 
After negotiating with the United States, North Korea suspended its withdrawal; 
however, it avoided full cooperation with the IAEA, and raised tensions again in 1994 by 
removing more than half of the spent fuel from its five MWe reactor without the IAEA 
monitoring.  
The Clinton administration suspected that North Korea could have more 
plutonium than it declared and worried that it might produce even more. Thus, the 
administration tried both diplomacy and coercion to discourage North Korea while 
displaying its readiness for military options. The United States came almost to the brink 
of a war with North Korea. Worried about the consequences of a preemptive strike, the 
Clinton administration decided to solve the crisis with diplomacy. Although this approach 
was  heavily  criticized  domestically,  particularly  by  Republicans,  it  relieved  North 
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Korea’s security concerns. Similar to the behavior of the insecure state illustrated in the 
Spiral model, North Korea responded positively to U.S. concessions addressing its 
concerns.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1.  Resistance to Full Cooperation 
Although North Korea had accepted IAEA inspections since 1977 on its small 
research reactor provided by the Soviet Union, it had resisted to acceding the NPT until 
1985 since it had considered the treaty unfair.47 After detecting evidence of North 
Korea’s secret nuclear activities in the 1980s, the United States became increasingly 
concerned about its nuclear program and wanted to establish international pressure on 
North Korea to join the NPT. In this way, the United States assumed, North Korea’s 
nuclear program would be easier to control. Upon North Korea’s resistance, the United 
States urged the Soviet Union to convince North Korea to accede the NPT. At that time, 
North Korea was trying to obtain light water nuclear reactors (LWR) from the Soviet 
Union for its energy needs providing the Soviets with a good opportunity to persuade 
North Korea. On Soviet insistence, North Korea agreed to sign the treaty in 1985.48  
Although the NPT required the member states to sign a safeguards agreement 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 18 months, the North Koreans 
did not agree to sign the agreement for almost seven years after acceding the NPT. The 
agreement would grant the IAEA permission to conduct inspections at North Korea’s 
nuclear facilities. North Korea’s resistance increased suspicions about North Korea’s 
secret nuclear activities. The North Koreans justified their behavior by claiming that U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea threaten them and argued that this was against 
the spirit of the NPT. Moreover, the United States and South Korea were conducting joint 
military exercises, named “Team Spirit,” which were increasing North Korea’s 
nervousness. With such justifications, North Korea delayed signing the safeguards 
agreement until 1992. In the meantime, the relations with the Soviet Union started to 
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decline; the Cold War ended; the Soviet Union collapsed; and North Korea lost its hope 
to get the LWRs. Nevertheless, it maintained its NPT membership so as not to cause an 
international conflict.49  
The United States applied diplomatic pressure on North Korea to compel it to sign 
the safeguards agreement and to permit IAEA inspections, which were important for 
verifying intelligence about North Korea’s nuclear activities and ambitions. However, 
North Korea signed the agreement only after the declaration of the withdrawal of U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and the cancellation of the 1992 Team Spirit 
exercise.  
After North Korea signed the safeguards agreement in January 1992, a delegation 
led by the Director General of the IAEA went to North Korea in May 1992 and visited 
the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. During the visit, the IAEA officials realized that the 
U.S. assessment about the capability of North Korea’s spent fuel reprocessing capability 
was exaggerated. The United States suspected that the huge building detected by its 
satellites could host facilities capable of producing a large amount of plutonium. The 
IAEA visit, however, revealed “the works inside the giant building as ‘extremely 
primitive’ and far from ready to produce the quantities of plutonium needed for a 
stockpile of atomic weapons.”50 On the other hand, during this visit and the following 
inspections, the IAEA experts noticed important discrepancies between the quantity of 
plutonium North Korea officially declared and the quantity it probably could have 
produced.  
In 1989, 1990, and 1991, the five MWe reactor at Yongbyon was shut down for a 
total of 151 days during which North Korea was suspected of removing some spent fuel 
rods to reprocess them to extract plutonium.51 North Korea declared to the IAEA that it 
had about 90 grams of plutonium. However, after detailed analysis of waste samples 
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taken during the inspections in 1992, the IAEA concluded that the North Koreans could 
have more plutonium than they had declared.52  
The IAEA findings unleashed a series of events that led to a nuclear 
confrontation. In addition to the six inspections conducted between May 1992 and 
February 1993, the IAEA wanted to carry out further investigations to clarify the 
discrepancies; therefore, it demanded special inspections of two undeclared nuclear waste 
sites at Yongbyon. North Korea refused to allow the special inspections, claiming that the 
inconsistencies were explainable and that the facilities to be inspected were not nuclear 
related and were under military control. However, after seeing several satellite 
photographs presented by the CIA, the IAEA was convinced that North Korea was trying 
to hide evidence of its past plutonium production activities. The IAEA officials insisted 
on inspecting the two waste sites; but, despite several attempts including a resolution by 
the IAEA Board of Governors in February 1993,53 North Korea did not allow further 
investigations. In the meantime the United States and South Korea resumed the Team 
Spirit exercises.  
2.  Intention to Withdraw from the NPT—1993 Crisis 
Claiming that both the demand for special inspections and the reinstatement of the 
Team Spirit exercise were threats to their sovereignty, their socialist system, and their 
existence, North Koreans declared their decision “to withdraw unavoidably from NPT as 
a measure to defend [their] supreme interests” on March 12, 1993.54 According to the 
NPT, the actual withdrawal would take place 90 days after the declaration of intention. 
Dismayed with North Korea’s declaration, the United States and South Korea quickly 
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assessed the possible consequences of North Korea’s withdrawal and reviewed options to 
discourage North Korea. A preemptive strike was considered to be not only incapable of 
destroying all North Korea’s plutonium but also a cause of a general war.55 In the 
meantime the IAEA decided in April 1993 to report North Korea’s non-compliance with 
its obligations and the IAEA’s inability to verify that there was no diversion of nuclear 
materials to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.56 Having received the 
IAEA’s report and stimulated by the United States,57 the UN Security Council passed a 
resolution in May 1993 calling upon North Korea “to reconsider its announcement” to 
withdraw from the NPT and “to reaffirm its commitment to the treaty,” and encouraging 
all Member States “to facilitate a solution.”58  
Worried about the consequences of military options and encouraged by the UN 
resolution, the Clinton administration decided to try to solve the problem with diplomacy 
by initiating negotiations with North Korea. The two states conducted governmental-level 
talks in New York in June 1993 and issued a joint statement expressing their agreement 
to principles of  
…assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear 
weapons; peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, including 
impartial application of full scope safeguards, mutual respect for each 
other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 
and support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.59 
 
Thus, just one day before the 90-day deadline for the official withdrawal from the NPT, 
North Korea declared its unilateral decision to suspend its withdrawal as long as it 
deemed necessary.60  
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3.  Attempt for More Plutonium—1994 Crisis 
The North Koreans later stated that with their decision to suspend their 
withdrawal from the NPT, they obtained “a unique status” regarding their relations with 
the NPT.61 Since the legal validity of the safeguard agreements had been virtually 
suspended from June 12, 1993, the North Koreans said, they no longer had to allow full 
scale inspections as long as no special agreement was reached between the IAEA and 
North Korea.62 On North Korea’s declaration of its intention to negotiate IAEA 
inspection terms after the second round of talks with the United States in July 1993, the 
IAEA made a new agreement with North Korea in February 1994. Thus, North Korea 
accepted inspections at its seven declared sites with the exception of the two waste sites. 
However, it restricted the activities of the inspection team arguing that the inspection 
should not be considered a regular one, but an inspection “aimed exclusively to maintain 
the continuity of safeguards, proper for the unique status of the North Korea.”63  
After the IAEA reported to the UN Security Council that the Agency was still 
“unable to draw conclusions as to whether there has been either diversion of nuclear 
material or reprocessing or other operations,” the Security Council urged North Korea to 
allow the IAEA inspections that had been agreed upon on 15 February 1994.64 North 
Korea accused the IAEA of lacking impartiality and being manipulated by the United 
States; however, it accepted the inspections that it had rejected before. The IAEA 
conducted these inspections and while analyzing the results, North Korea declared its 
intention to refuel its five MWe Reactor. The IAEA wanted to examine a number of fuel 
rods during the removal of spent fuel, but North Korea refused the request and started to 
discharge the reactor without the agreement of IAEA, causing a nuclear crisis again. By 
not allowing the IAEA to monitor the discharge and to take samples from the spent fuel, 
North Korea prevented an important opportunity to learn if any spent fuel had been 
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previously taken out for possible reprocessing and plutonium separation.65 Additionally, 
North Korea could extract more plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed 
during the discharge. 
The Clinton administration prepared to submit a proposal to the United Nations 
Security Council for applying economic sanctions against North Korea and contemplated 
a military buildup. The United States came almost to the brink of a war with North 
Korea. William Perry, the Defense Secretary of the Clinton administration, later revealed 
that “We were within a day of making major additions to our troop deployments to 
Korea, and we were about to undertake an evacuation of American civilians from 
Korea.”66 Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter was also convinced that if the United 
States had been successful in imposing an embargo against North Korea, North Korea 
would have risked a war.67 Thus, he decided to accept Kim Il Sung’s invitation to North 
Korea in July 1994. He was not officially representing the United States, and the Clinton 
administration was not very happy with this visit. However, Carter’s visit revealed North 
Korea’s willingness to cooperate.  
While President Clinton was discussing the military options and its possible 
consequences with his top defense advisors, Carter called from North Korea and said that 
North Koreans agreed to negotiate a freeze of their nuclear activities. Some observers 
argue that North Korea was expecting support from China, and when China informed 
North Korea that it would not veto economic sanctions, North Korea decided to change 
its course and agreed to a freeze of its nuclear activities.68 Regardless of this, North 
Korea declared its willingness to freeze its nuclear program during former President 
Jimmy Carter’s visit to North Korea in July 1994. Worried about North Korea’s nuclear 
program, the Clinton administration welcomed the outcome of Carter’s visit since it 
provided an opportunity to solve the problem without resorting to military options. As 
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Galluci stated, the administration “wanted to talk to them, get them back into the NPT, 
get them to abide by the North-South Declaration on Denuclearization, and to accept 
special inspections by the IAEA.”69  Thus, the administration agreed to drop its sanctions 
proposal and initiated high-level negotiations with North Korea.  
One month after Carter’s visit, the founder of North Korea, Kim Sung Il, died and 
his son, Kim Jung Il, took over as the new leader. He maintained his father’s recent 
cooperative approach, and, after a number of negotiations, the United States and North 
Korea signed the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994 in Geneva. With the Agreed 
Framework, North Korea agreed to freezing and ultimately dismantling its existing 
nuclear program in return for two new light-water reactors and shipments of heavy fuel 
oil (50,000 tons in 1995 and 500,000 tons annually beginning in 1996) to meet its energy 
needs until the first new reactor becomes operational. The agreement also called for 
improved diplomatic relations and economic ties, and for U.S. assurances that it would 
not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. 
To advance the implementation of the Agreed Framework, an international 
consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), was 
created in 1995. However, the speed of implementation of the Agreed Framework was 
slower than expected. Since the Clinton administration’s cooperation with North Korea 
was heavily criticized domestically, particularly by Republicans, as rewarding North 
Korea’s bad behavior, the Clinton administration encountered difficulties in convincing 
the Congress to support the agreement. Moreover, the Congress was suspicious of North 
Korea’s nuclear activities and the heavy fuel oil shipments were costly. As a result, the 
administration faced several policy problems in convincing the Congress to approve the 
money needed to implement the Agreed Framework. There were also some rumors that 
North Korea was not using the oil for only energy purposes. Claiming that North Korea 
was violating the Agreed Framework, the United States slowed its efforts to complete the 
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construction of the two promised power plants. The slow implementation provided North 
Korea with sufficient pretexts to complain about U.S. reluctance to fulfill its 
commitments.  
C. ANALYSIS: THE DETERRENCE OR THE SPIRAL MODEL  
1.  North Korea’s Motive to Join the NPT 
While explaining their agreement to the NPT, North Koreans say that they had 
examined other options, such as hydroelectric and thermoelectric energy production 
capabilities, to meet their energy needs before resorting to nuclear reactors as an energy 
source; nonetheless, these options were incapable of meeting their increasing energy 
demands.70 Nuclear energy was the best option for their energy needs, and for this reason 
they wanted to purchase LWRs from Western countries, including Canada, Sweden, and 
France. However, North Koreans claim, this was obstructed by the U.S. Coordinating 
Committee for Export Control to Communist Areas (COCOM). Thus, they turned to the 
Soviet Union for LWRs although Soviet technology was not well developed. The Soviet 
Union said that if North Korea wanted to get nuclear-related technologies, they must 
enter the NPT and sign safeguard agreements with the IAEA. In addition to the 
conditional Soviet offer, North Koreans say that the NPT's negative security assurances 
caught their attention, and they joined the treaty “with the purpose to realize international 
cooperation in the nuclear power industry sector, remove nuclear threats toward them, 
and make the Korean peninsula a non-nuclear zone,”71 and to secure the country's 
sovereignty.72 From this perspective, North Korea resembles the insecure state illustrated 
in the spiral model, which tries to survive in the face of threats against its existence. 
North Korea’s agreement to the NPT membership, however, is not a strong piece 
of evidence to believe that North Korea was sincere with its naïve concerns. Although the 
NPT required member states sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, North Korea 
did not sign the agreement until 1992. Moreover, despite its agreement later, North Korea 
appeared to be blocking the inspections. The North Koreans, as Oberdorfer argued, might 
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not have precisely understood the consequences of adherence to the treaty,73 or they 
might have calculated that they could delay the IAEA inspections for a time sufficient to 
secretly produce enough plutonium for nuclear weapons. Additionally, they might have 
thought that agreeing to the agreement would give them an opportunity to suspend the 
agreement in the future for some reasons and then to offer resuming the agreement in 
exchange for further benefits. According to the United States, North Korea had 
something to hide. If these assumptions were correct North Korea would be an aggressor 
state, which wants to take advantage of the weaknesses of the other side as described in 
the deterrence model. According to the North Koreans, however, they delayed the 
inspections because their security-related expectations from the NPT had not been 
addressed yet. Additionally, the North Koreans claimed that they objected to the 
inspections after signing the agreement because the inspections turned out to be 
threatening North Korea’s sovereignty.  
On balance, the evidence suggest that the North Koreans delayed the signing of 
the safeguards agreement because they believed that the United States continued to 
threaten them, which was a violation of legal obligations under the NPT. The NPT 
requires the nuclear weapons states guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used 
against other members. However, the United States, the North Koreans argued, was still 
threatening them by deploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea on a massive 
scale. In addition to this, the United States and South Korea were conducting the Team 
Spirit exercises.74 The North Koreans said that they had signed the NPT on the 
assumption that the U.S. nuclear threat would be removed.75 However, the North 
Koreans claimed that the United States increased nuclear threats against them after they 
entered the treaty. As a result, North Korea did not sign the safeguard agreements.76 
The North Koreans, indeed, agreed to the safeguards agreements when their 
concerns were addressed. Beginning with the Carter administration, the number of U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea was gradually reduced. Finally in September 
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1991, the United States unilaterally announced the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear 
weapons deployed abroad, including those in South Korea. This withdrawal was part of 
the overall change in the U.S. nuclear strategy “…calculated to bring reciprocal steps 
form Moscow.”77 Nevertheless, it had a positive impact on the Korean peninsula. 
Following this unilateral move of the United States, North and South Korea concluded 
the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in January 1992, 
under which they agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, 
deploy, or use nuclear weapons, or to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium 
enrichment facilities.78 Additionally, South Korea and the United States decided to cancel 
the 1992 joint Team Spirit exercise. North Korea regarded these developments as positive 
responses to its demands based on its security concerns and agreed to sign the safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA in January 1992. 
North Korea appears to have two expectations from its membership in the NPT 
and from its agreement to the IAEA safeguards: to easily obtain nuclear energy related 
materials, and to be safer against U.S. nuclear threats. States do not resort to nuclear 
weapons unless they have strong incentives, and states do not give up their capability 
unless their concerns are addressed satisfactorily. North Korea’s entrance into the NPT, 
despite its resistance for a while, suggests that the conditional nuclear energy offer from 
the Soviet Union and the negative security assurances provided by the NPT were 
sufficient to address its concerns. North Korea’s expectations from its membership to 
NPT do not look like greedy demands. Moreover, if North Korea had had aggressive 
motives for producing nuclear weapons, it would have preferred to stay out of the non-
proliferation regime to avoid being inspected and restricted internationally. Therefore, the 
spiral model better explains North Korea’s agreement to the NPT. Its behavior was 
mostly insecurity driven actions, however, outsiders perceived North Korea’s behavior as 
greediness because of general distrust against North Korea and because of its suspicious 
moves. 
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2.  North Korea’s Reasons to Resist International Control 
When IAEA requested further investigation in 1993, North Koreans informed the 
IAEA that North Korea declared a state of semi war because of the reinstatement of the 
US-South Korea Team Spirit military exercise for 1993. Under such circumstances, the 
North Koreans argued, they “…could not but reserve consideration of the receipt of the 
inspection team concerning the implementation of the unjust resolution of the February 
Board meeting.”79 North Korea, moreover, argued that the IAEA’s demand for special 
inspections was a U.S. manipulation. The United States and some circles in the IAEA, 
North Korea claimed, “…abused the inspections…as a way to spy on [their] interior and 
crush [their] socialist system.”80 According to North Koreans, although forbidden by the 
safeguards agreement of 1992,81 some IAEA Secretariat circles informed the United 
States about the inspection results, “…and the United States came forward demanding 
special inspections of [North Korea’s] military facilities with the excuse of some 
inconsistencies or other, which the United States created.”82 Accepting IAEA inspections 
based on U.S. manipulations meant providing the United States, “the counterpart of 
[their] war,” with the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance in North Korea’s military 
bases, and it was impossible “…under the special circumstances in which the country was 
divided and [North Koreans] were constantly under the U.S. nuclear threat.” 83 
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The North Korean government stated that demanding a special inspection of their 
military sites unrelated to nuclear activities was “…a violation on the sovereignty of the 
DPRK, an interference in its internal affairs and a hostile act aimed at stifling [their] 
socialism.”84 The North Koreans claimed that accepting the demand for the special 
inspections would be the first step in further exposing all their military installations. 
Indeed, as David Albright argued, inspections of the two waste sites would merely show 
whether North Korea had more plutonium. The exact amount of plutonium, however, 
could not be reliably determined with those inspections; therefore, further investigations 
would be required to verify the total plutonium North Korea has separated.85  
The North Koreans believed the demand for special inspections was a U.S. 
scenario written in advance to realize U.S. goals one by one. By implementing the 
scenario, the United States would learn more about North Korea’s military capability. If 
North Korea resisted, the United States would take the matter to the United Nations in 
order to impose collective sanctions on North Korea.86 North Korea had joined the NPT 
to remove the U.S. nuclear threats. However, the reinstatement of the Team Spirit 
exercises, North Koreans argued, violated the spirit of the NPT jeopardizing the 
sovereignty and security of North Korea. Under such circumstances North Korea had to 
withdraw from the NPT “…as a measure to defend its supreme interests.”87 Thus, North 
Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993. 
The United States, on the other hand, insisted that North Korea was hiding 
something significant and this was the obvious explanation for its behavior. During a 
Senate hearing, James Woolsey, the first director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) in the Clinton administration said, “Of greatest concern is the real possibility that 
North Korea has already manufactured enough fissile material for at least one nuclear 
weapon and is hiding this from the IAEA.”88 According to the Clinton administration 
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North Korea had built its reactors at Yongbyon not for energy production but for 
plutonium production. If the North Koreans had allowed the special inspections, this 
would have substantially restricted their ability to develop nuclear weapons.89 That was 
the reason for North Korea’s resistance to inspections. As some experts argued, North 
Korea might have underestimated the technical capability of the IAEA, or hoped a 
possible revelation of its past nuclear activities would be downplayed.90 However, for 
other observers, like Leon V. Sigal, if North Korea had wanted to produce nuclear 
weapons it could have shut down its reactor at any time and produce enough plutonium to 
make five or six nuclear weapons.91 On the contrary, North Korea agreed to the 
safeguards agreement and allowed the IAEA inspections. As Sigal stated, “For a country 
supposedly hell-bent on bomb-making, its restraint was difficult to explain.”92 
North Korea’s ambition to hide its past nuclear activities supports, to some extent, 
the possibility that North Korea wanted nuclear weapons in any case independent from its 
threat perception. From this perspective, its resistance to international control on its 
nuclear program resembles the behaviors of the greedy state illustrated in the deterrence 
model. North Korea appeared to be resisting to the point it understood that no further 
excuse would be accepted by the international community and by the United States. On 
the other hand, North Korea’s resistance to special IAEA inspections and its decision to 
withdraw from the NPT can be justified by two reasons: (1) North Korea was really 
embarrassed by the IAEA’s insistence for special inspections believing that it was an 
unjust U.S. manipulation ignoring its sovereignty. That is, North Korea wanted to be 
treated as a sovereign member. (2) Combined with the reinstatement of the Joint Spirit 
exercises, IAEA insistence provided the North Koreans with sufficient reasons to believe 
that the NPT membership was a disappointment since it was not strengthening their 
security, instead it was threatening their regime. Despite some evidence that supports the 
deterrence  model,  these  reasons  sound  convincing  and  suggest  that  North  Korea’s  
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behavior can be better explained by the spiral model. North Korea was concerned about 
the survival of its regime and resisted to the point it thought there would be less threat 
against the regime. 
3.  The Clinton Administration’s Reasons to Prefer Diplomacy 
In 1993, the United States reviewed the military options but decided to rely on 
diplomacy. First, it tried to obtain international support and stimulated the United Nations 
Security Council to pass a resolution. Then, it initiated bilateral talks with North Korea. 
According to Robert Galluci, the Clinton administration’s chief negotiator at that time, 
bilateral talks with North Korea were a concession and the Clinton administration 
“knowingly made that concession, because they thought it was the right thing to do.”93 In 
response to this concession, North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. 
It also agreed to quit reprocessing spent fuel and to continue accepting inspections. In 
1994, after North Korea discharged spent fuel in a way not approved by the United States 
and the IAEA, the Clinton administration stopped negotiating. According to Galluci, the 
United States “only went back to the table after [the administration] raised the bar a bit 
and told North Korea they could also no longer produce more plutonium in their 
reactors.”94 That is, North Korea had to agree not to operate its nuclear reactor in addition 
to its former concessions.  
The Clinton administration could have conducted a military operation; however, 
they believed that the outcome could have been “a lot more costly even than constructing 
light water reactors and delivering heavy fuel oil.”95 The United States had the capability 
to conduct a surgical operation to the facilities at Yongbyon with conventional high 
precision munitions without causing an environmental problem.96 However, nobody 
could guarantee that all the plutonium extracted would be at Yongbyon facilities. 
Moreover, given North Korea’s million man army deployed very close to the DMZ, and 
                                                 
93 Robert Galluci, CSIS Conference: Nuclear Confrontation with North Korea: Lessons of the 1994 
Crisis for Today, March 20, 2003, Seoul, Korea. 
94 Gallluci, CSIS Conference: Nuclear Confrontation with North Korea, March 20, 2003. 
95 Gallluci, CSIS Conference: Nuclear Confrontation with North Korea, March 20, 2003. 
96 Ashton Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from 1993-1996, 
Interview by Martin Smith for Kim’s Nuclear Gamble, Frontline, PBS, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wbbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/acarter.html. 
38 
its thousands of artillery tubes and several SCUD missiles aimed at Seoul, the officials of 
the Clinton administration assessed that the consequences of a U.S. preemptive strike 
might be a deadly North Korean attack on South Korea with tens of thousands of deaths 
on both sides.97 
 The United States and South Korea had jointly devised a contingency plan called 
Op Plan 5027 against North Korea’s attacks, and, according to Ashton Carter, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from 1993-1996, the United States 
and South Korea could destroy North Korea’s forces within just a few weeks and destroy 
its regime. However, Carter said, the officials of the Clinton administration could not 
assure anybody, including the President, that North Korea would not act irrationally and 
would not risk a war to respond a U.S. preemptive strike.98 As a result, the Clinton 
administration mostly relied on diplomacy.  
The Clinton administration’s policies in this period were actually a tit-for-tat 
strategy. The United States made conditional concessions which required important 
reciprocal movements from the North Korean side. Given that North Korea had some 
reasonable excuses to resist international control on its nuclear program and that it 
positively responded to the Clinton administration’s tit-for-tat strategy, it is not fair to 
claim that North Korea increased tensions to obtain further concessions. Therefore, North 
Korea does not exactly resemble the aggressor state illustrated in the deterrence model. 
North Korea mostly behaved like the insecure state in the spiral model. It reciprocated to 
U.S. concessions that addressed its security concerns by agreeing to further compromises. 
One can think that North Korea’s reciprocal moves might also be a result of its 
perception about U.S. resolve to strike. However, given the Clinton administration’s 
concerns about the consequence of a military operation, North Korea must have made it 
clear that it was ready to retaliate, not to retreat. If North Korea had been an aggressor 
eager to increase its interests, it would have acted less determinedly and retreated in the 
face of U.S. military buildup in the region, as suggested in the deterrence model. Given 
its resolve to retaliate, claiming that North Korea was a greedy state does not sound 
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conceivable. But, it is also possible that the Clinton administration misinterpreted North 
Korea’s bluffing as resolve. The U.S. assessment about North Korea’s readiness to 
retaliate might have been a misperception. Therefore, it is still possible to believe that 
North Korea decided to cooperate in the face of U.S. resolve. However, North Korea’s 
main concern was the survival of its existence. Additionally it agreed to more 
concessions in exchange for U.S. concessions. Therefore, concluding that the spiral 
model better explains the interactions between the Clinton administration and North 
Korea looks more reasonable. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The reason for the North Korean crisis in 1993 and 1994 was the U.S. suspicion 
that North Korea might have separated more plutonium than they had declared to the 
IAEA, and that it could increase the amount of its plutonium by reprocessing the spent 
fuel that it removed from the five-MWe reactor. The Clinton administration calculated 
that North Korea might have produced enough plutonium for one or two nuclear 
weapons. The administration believed that if they could not prevent North Korea from 
producing nuclear weapons, it would weaken the deterrence-based stability on the Korean 
peninsula and make war more likely.99  
North Korea justified its struggle with the IAEA by pointing out the threat posed 
by the United States and so-called unjust decisions and impartial behaviors of the IAEA. 
It apparently maintained a desire for nuclear weapons as a hedge against the threats it 
perceived. North Korea seemed to be reciprocating to cooperative approaches; however, 
it also tried to circumvent its obligations. North Korea’s resistance to IAEA inspections 
and its efforts to hide its past nuclear activities suggested that it was an aggressor. Its 
desire to maximize its gains whenever it was possible made North Korea seem greedy. 
However, its persistence to maintain a nuclear weapons production capability still 
appeared to be primarily an insecurity driven reaction. As a matter of fact, when the 
Clinton administration’s cooperative approaches relieved North Korea’s security 
concerns, North Korea positively responded to U.S. concessions, as suggested in the 
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spiral model. As a result the Agreed Framework was signed between the two states 
preventing North Korea from producing more plutonium. 
The Agreed Framework was not sufficient to address to all U.S. concerns about 
North Korea, however it was the optimum solution for that time. Although criticized as 
appeasement, the Agreement Framework was a success. As some expert stated, if the 
Clinton administration did not freeze North Korea's plutonium based nuclear program, 
North Korea would today have enough plutonium for at least 30 nuclear weapons.100 
According to U.S. intelligence disclosures in 2002, North Korea apparently tried to 
obtain uranium enrichment technology in the late 1990s circumventing the Agreed 
Framework. Nevertheless, North Korea’s attempt to try a second track to produce nuclear 
weapons does not necessarily indicate the absolute failure of cooperative approaches. At 
least, the Clinton administration’s approach was successful in freezing North Korea’s 
plutonium production capability and in avoiding an imminent war. Moreover, as the 
following chapter will discuss, neither North Korea’s alleged violation in the late 1990s 
nor its attempt to resume its nuclear program after October 2002 was a result of the 
failure of cooperative policies. On the contrary, North Korea’s behavior appeared to be 
either a reaction to unsatisfactory execution of cooperative policies or a response to 
coercive policies.  
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IV. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND NORTH KOREA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the confrontation between the United States and North 
Korea after the George W. Bush administration took office in 2001. It focuses on the 
crisis that started in October 2002 with the U.S. announcement of North Korea’s 
admittance of its clandestine uranium enrichment program. The chapter also examines the 
motives of North Korea to withdraw from the NPT in January 2003 and to resume its 
nuclear program that had been frozen since 1994. It considers the reasons for the Bush 
administration to pursue an uncooperative policy towards North Korea when compared to 
the Clinton administration’s policies. The chapter analyzes the correlations between 
North Korea’s recent behavior and the Bush administration’s policies to see whether 
North Koreans are provoked by the U.S. policies and the preemption concept in the new 
U.S. National Security Strategy, or they are trying to leverage U.S. concerns about their 
nuclear weapons program to achieve some political and economic objectives, or some 
combination of both. 
The findings of the chapter suggest that the North Koreans, on the one hand, 
might have decided to initiate a secret uranium enrichment program long before the Bush 
administration came to power mostly because of their dissatisfaction with the 
implementation of the Agreed Framework and their distrust to the continuity of the 
cooperative policies of the United States. On the other hand, the reason for the North 
Koreans to resume their plutonium-based nuclear weapons program, at the end of 2002, 
seems to be the shift in U.S. policies from bilateral cooperation to multilateral coercion 
after the Bush administration came into power.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1.  The Bush Administration Policies Towards North Korea  
Although the Bush administration announced, when they took office, that they 
would maintain the Clinton administration’s approach towards North Korea, their 
policies have turned out to be remarkably different over time. President Bush’s remarks 
during a press briefing at the White House with the South Korean President on March 7, 
2001, signaled the shift from the Clinton administration’s policies regarding North Korea. 
In his responses to questions about North Korea, President Bush cited his skepticism 
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about the North Korean leader, Kim Jung Il, and said that the United States was not 
certain whether or not North Korea was adhering to existing agreements with the United 
States. 101  
Although President Bush mentioned U.S. interest in establishing a dialogue with 
North Korea, his remarks mainly stressed the unwillingness to resume talks with North 
Korea that were initiated during the Clinton period. Nevertheless, the Bush 
administration decided to resume the talks after a comprehensive review of the policies 
towards North Korea. In June 2001, President Bush announced that he had directed his 
national security team to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad 
agenda. The aim of this comprehensive approach was to offer North Korea the 
opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of its desire for improved relations.  If North 
Korea accepted this offer, President Bush said, the United States would expand its efforts 
to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.102 On this 
presidential guidance, officials from both sides met to arrange bilateral talks.  
While preparations for bilateral talks were ongoing, President Bush again 
indicated that his administration’s policies would be very different towards North Korea. 
In his well-known State of the Union address in January 2002, he condemned North 
Korean leadership for arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while 
starving its citizens. Moreover, he identified North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, as 
part of an axis of evil, and accused it of arming to threaten the peace of the world. Bush 
said, “the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to 
threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.”103 With this blunt accusation and 
threat, North Koreans should have understood that the United States policies would not 
be as cooperative as in the Clinton period.  
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2.  North Korea’s Perceptions 
Observing the different approach of the Bush administration from the outset, 
North Korean leaders had already decided that the new administration’s approach was 
aiming “to isolate and stifle North Korea…to torpedo the dialogue between the North and 
the South…and to put the brake on the movement of the Korean nation for 
reunification.”104 President Bush’s remarks, the North Koreans said, raised the question: 
“…why did the present U.S. administration rule out even the possibility of seeking a 
negotiated settlement of the nuclear and missile issues created in the period of the 
preceding administration.”105 They argued that the Bush administration’s “hardliner 
stand” and “policy of strength” was the continuation of the previous efforts of the United 
States to block peace and reunification of Korea.106  
The North Koreans seemed to perceive President Bush’s axis of evil speech as an 
open disclosure of U.S. intentions. In their opinion, rhetoric about resuming the bilateral 
talks was proved not credible by Bush’s remarks while propositions for negotiation and 
dialog were masks to hide the real aims of the United States. The United States, 
according to the North Koreans, was pushing the situation to the brink of war. A 
spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry described President Bush’s axis of evil 
speech as “little short of declaring a war.”107 However, the North Koreans were “fully 
prepared for both dialogue and war” and determined “to take thousand-fold revenge on 
aggressors.”108 Furthermore, they stated, “The option to ‘strike’, impudently advocated 
by the U.S., [was] not its monopoly.”109 The United States, the North Koreans said, 
should abandon the aggressive and hostile policy towards the North Korea and honestly 
implement the Agreed Framework of 1994.110   
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3. North Korea’s Alleged Violation 
Despite the mutual provocative remarks and movements, the Bush administration 
maintained its decision to resume the talks. After North Korea announced that it would 
indefinitely extend its moratorium on testing long-range missiles on September 17, 2002, 
the Bush administration said that it would send an interagency delegation to North 
Korea.111 Subsequently, an interagency delegation led by James Kelly, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian-Pacific Affairs, traveled to Pyongyang and met with 
North Korean officials on October 3-5, 2002. During the talks, U.S. delegation “advised 
the North Koreans that [the United States] had recently acquired information that 
indicates that North Korea has a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons in 
violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements.”112  
The Bush administration had acquired this information in the summer of 2002. 
The CIA, according to Seymour M. Hersh, had informed President Bush and his top 
advisors in June 2002 that North Korea started to enrich significant quantities of uranium 
in 2001 with the help of Pakistan, which it had received since 1997.113 Even before the 
CIA report, the Bush administration suspected North Korea of cheating and accused 
North Korea of violating the relevant treaties. Based on the same suspicion, some 
congress members had urged the administration to suspend the U.S. commitments in the 
Agreed Framework. However, the Bush administration was not sure whether to confront 
the North Koreans or maintain silence.114 Apparently, the administration did not want 
another crisis with North Korea while worldwide discussions about a military operation 
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against Iraq were ongoing. “The CIA report,” according to Hersh, “had predicted that 
North Korea, if confronted with the evidence, would not risk an open break with the 1994 
agreement and would do nothing to violate the NPT.”115 The CIA assessment about 
North Korea’s reaction seemed to have convinced the Bush administration that openly 
talking to North Koreans would not cause another crisis, which proved incorrect after the 
October 2002 talks. On October 16, 2002, the United States officially announced that 
North Koreans admitted during the talks that they had a program to enrich uranium for 
nuclear weapons.116 Later, during a press briefing in South Korea, Assistant Secretary 
Kelly said,  
 
I told the North that they must immediately and visibly dismantle this 
covert nuclear weapons program. After initial denials, North Korean 
officials flatly acknowledged that they have such a program and declared 
that they considered the Agreed Framework to be ‘nullified.’ The North 
Korean side attempted to blame this situation on recent U.S. policy, but I 
pointed out that this was inconsistent with information we had that their 
uranium enrichment program is already several years old.117  
 
According to James Kelly, North Koreans had admitted the existence of their 
secret uranium enrichment; however, North Koreans repeatedly denied that they admitted 
the covert program during the October 2002 talks. For example, in August 2003, North 
Korea's vice minister of foreign affairs said, 
 
Kelly, who came to the DPRK as a special envoy of President Bush in 
October 2002, failing to present any specific ‘evidence,’ groundlessly 
pulled us up, using coercive words and rudely behaving, ignoring the 
oriental custom. He claimed that we have secretly pushed forward an 
enriched uranium programme in breach of the Agreed Framework. In this 
regard we made it clear that we have no secret nuclear programme but we 
are entitled to have weapons more powerful than those based on enriched 
uranium. We have powerful weapons, including single-hearted unity. 
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After Kelly's Pyongyang visit, the U.S. misled the public opinion, saying 
that we admitted to the secret nuclear programme… 118 
 
Although denied by the North Koreans, the Bush administration insisted that North Korea 
had been cheating. On this claim, the administration decided to change its approach 
towards North Korea. The Bush administration focused on consultations with friends and 
allies “to bring maximum international pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
weapons ambitions.”119 Following this decision, a series of events unfolded that 
amounted to a nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea. 
4.  The Third Nuclear Crisis  
After announcing North Korea’s alleged admittance of its clandestine nuclear 
program, the United States persuaded the other members of the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO) to suspend the oil shipments to North Korea. On 
November 14, 2002, KEDO announced, “Heavy fuel oil deliveries will be suspended 
beginning with the December shipment. Future shipments will depend on North Korea’s 
concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly enriched uranium 
program. In this light, other KEDO activities with North Korea will be reviewed.”120  
North Korea responded to the U.S.-led decision to cut oil shipments by saying 
that the 1994 agreement had collapsed. North Korea later announced that it would restart 
the five megawatt-electric gas-graphite reactor, the plutonium separation facility, and the 
fuel fabrication plant at Yongbyon. North Korea also announced that it was resuming 
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construction of the 50 megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon and a 200 megawatt-
electric reactor at Taechon.121 Then, North Korea expelled the IAEA officials, removed 
the IAEA seals and monitoring equipment from Yongbyon facilities, and officially 
withdrew from the NPT in January 2003. Subsequently, in February 2003, the North 
Koreans declared that they had restarted the reactor in Yongbyon to produce electricity. 
Further increasing tensions, North Korea conducted test firings of a developmental cruise 
missile, intercepted an unarmed U.S. airplane operating in international airspace, and 
gave the impression that it was reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods to extract 
plutonium, which would be enough for five or six nuclear weapons.  
According to the Bush administration, North Korea’s behaviors were 
“provocations designed to blackmail the United States and to intimidate its friends and 
allies” to get the United States agree to bilateral talks, which means “giving the North 
what it wants, and on its terms.”122 However, according to the North Koreans, their 
behavior was a reaction to U.S. noncompliance with the Agreed Framework and to the 
Bush administration’s intention for a “pre-emptive nuclear attack” on North Korea.  
North Koreans argued that the United States had no will to implement the Agreed 
Framework and it systematically violated the agreement expecting the collapse of North 
Korea.123 The United States, in their opinion, deliberately delayed the conclusion of the 
contract regarding the LWRs to force North Korea to receive South Korea-type LWRs, 
whose technological feasibility and capability were in question by North Koreans.124 The 
construction of the LWRs was also delayed with some pretexts, and, as a result, North 
Koreans suffered a huge loss of electricity and a big economic crisis, threatening their 
existence today. Additionally, North Koreans said, the United States did not properly 
deliver the 500,000-ton heavy fuel oil pledged in the Agreed Framework to compensate 
North Korea’s energy loss. North Koreans also accused the United States of lifting only 
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some symbolic sanctions while refusing to lift the trade and investment related sanctions, 
although this was an obligation imposed on both sides by the Agreed Framework.  
As a matter of fact, the implementation of the Agreed Framework was slow for 
several reasons. First, the United States was suspicious about North Korea’s compliance 
with the agreement. For example, in the mid-1998 the United States detected an 
underground site near Kum-chang-ri in North Korea, so the LWR project was postponed 
in 1999 since the United States suspected that North Korea was hiding a nuclear facility 
in Kum-chang-ri. After negotiations with North Korea, the United States visited the 
facility in Kum-chang-ri in May 1999 and in May 2000. However, “the United States 
concluded that the site as then configured was not suited to house a nuclear reactor or 
reprocessing operations and therefore was not a violation of the Agreed Framework.”125 
Although disproved, the suspicion about North Korea continued to cause resistance in the 
Congress.  
The second reason for the slow implementation of the agreement is that the 
Congress insisted on linking its support to North Korea’s performance in other areas 
which are not directly related to the Agreed Framework. For example, during the KEDO 
General Conference in May 2002, Ambassador Charles H. Pritchard, U.S. Representative 
to KEDO, said, 
The U.S. Congress, for example, has required the President to make 
certain certifications before funding can be obligated to KEDO. The 
language has varied from year to year, but Congress clearly harbors deep 
concerns about North Korea's missile program, about its deteriorating 
relations with South Korea, which we all hope are now on the mend, and 
about the degree of its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). 126 
 
This meant that North Korea’s further concessions in other areas irrelevant to the Agreed 
Framework were required to implement the agreement without interruptions.  
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A third reason for the slow implementation concerned interpretation of the 
Agreed Framework. Daniel Pinkston, a Korea specialist, argues that the Agreed 
Framework required a number of very complex transactions.127 According to Pinkston, 
the document is very short; nonetheless, there are a lot of details that had to be worked 
out. This makes the agreement prone to misinterpretation; therefore, both sides had 
different expectations about what the other side was supposed to do. For example, the 
Bush administration wanted North Korea to come into full compliance with its IAEA 
safeguards agreement immediately after the concrete pouring ceremony for the light 
water reactor since completing the IAEA inspections would last 3-4 years.128 On the 
other hand, North Koreans argued that they did not have to do so until the construction of 
the reactor grew closer to completion as described in the agreement.129  
Raising money for the implementation of the Agreed Framework was another 
problem. South Korea, who had the biggest responsibility in funding the LWR project 
that would cost approximately 4.5 billion dollars, asked the United States to provide 
financial support for the project. However, since Congress was delaying the approval of 
the necessary budget, the United State said it could not make any contribution to the 
LWR project.130 The Congress also resisted funding for oil shipments since North Korea 
was suspected of diverting some of the oil for military use. Although the State 
Department declared that “no clear evidence has emerged of any significant diversion of 
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the deliveries of heavy fuel oil to North Korea to unauthorized purposes,”131 convincing 
the Congress to finance the oil shipments was a problem for the administration. To add to 
the problem, the oil prices and the cost of shipment increased, and KEDO needed 
additional funding to pay for the scheduled heavy fuel oil deliveries.132 As a 
consequence, North Koreans did not receive the heavy fuel oil regularly and continued to 
complain about the consequences on its economy. 
In addition to the dissatisfaction with the heavy fuel oil delivery and the LWR 
project, North Korea also complained that the United States did not provide the formal 
security assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, which was an 
obligation described in the 1994 agreement.133 Increasing their security concerns, the 
North Koreans claimed, the United States issued the U.S. -Japan Defense Cooperation 
Guidelines in 1994, which they believed were aimed at the Korean Peninsula, and moved 
depleted uranium shells from Japan to South Korea in 1997 to use in a possible war.134 
Moreover, the North Koreans said, the U.S. Chief of Staff and the top South Korean 
military men claimed in a joint statement in 1999 that “North Koreans remained a 
constant threat to their national interests” and they would “strongly retaliate against North 
Koreans with nuclear weapon and all other means in the case of emergency.”135 And 
finally, the Bush administration, the North Koreans believed, “openly declared that they 
would ‘break down’ [our] system.”136 
5. Multilateral Diplomacy and Deterrence 
While using rhetoric on both conditional cooperation and deterrence to solve the 
problem, the Bush administration continued to charge North Korea of cheating and 
blackmailing. The administration’s officials, including the President, repeatedly stated 
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that the crisis should be resolved through peaceful and multilateral diplomacy. They 
insisted that North Korea should end its nuclear weapons acquisition program verifiably 
and irreversibly before any cooperative engagement. The administration rejected North 
Korea’s appeal for bilateral dialogue, considering it as nuclear blackmail, and stated that 
the United States tried negotiating before, but North Korea responded by deceiving. 137 
This time a different and more comprehensive approach, a multilateral approach was 
necessary. Moreover, the administration argued, North Korea must first shut down its 
nuclear weapons program and other regional powers should be included in any talks.138 
Besides the rhetoric about solving the problem by multilateral diplomacy, the United 
States also demonstrated its readiness for military options in early March 2003 by 
deploying 24 long-range bombers to Guam, within striking distance of North Korea. 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said that the Bush administration’s decision to 
put U.S. bombers on alert in the Pacific was simply to reinforce U.S. deterrent posture.139 
That is, the well-known carrot and stick policy was at work. 
After several attempts, the United States succeeded in convincing North Korea to 
join a trilateral meeting in April 2003 and a six-country talk in August 2003 in Beijing. 
However, no progress has been achieved in terms of convincing the North Koreans to 
quit their nuclear weapons program during these diplomatic initiatives. North Korea 
insisted on U.S. security assurances, and the United States insisted on the irreversible and 
verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The North Koreans 
repeatedly denied their admittance of the secret uranium enrichment program and 
reiterated their claims about the misconduct of the United States at every opportunity. 
They kept saying it was the United States that claimed the existence of the secret nuclear 
program in North Korea without presenting any specific evidence. On the other hand, the 
North Koreans claimed that they had successfully finished the reprocessing of some 
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8,000 spent fuel rods.140 They also implied that they had nuclear weapons and they 
would enlarge their arsenal. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry said, 
As the United States has no intention to drop its hostile policy, the DPRK 
will consistently maintain and increase its nuclear deterrent force as a just 
self-defensive means to repel the U.S. preemptive nuclear attack and 
ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region 
according to the decision of the First Session of the 11th Supreme People's 
Assembly. 141 
As of this writing, the Bush administration still insists that the issue is not 
between the United States and North Korea but a multilateral one. Nevertheless, they 
appear to be willing to act more cooperatively to support the multilateral approach.  
During a trip to Asia in October 2003, President Bush announced that the United States 
would consider providing North Korea with a written security assurance, if not a treaty. 
Secretary Colin Powell explained that they preferred an agreement instead of a treaty 
because an agreement would be easier to achieve since it would not have to go to the 
Senate for approval.142 Although the North Koreans initially rejected the Bush 
administration’s offer, they later announced that they would consider it as long as their 
concerns are addressed.  
C. ANALYSIS: THE DETERRENCE OR THE SPIRAL MODEL  
1.  The Impact of Bush Administration’s Policies  
The Bush administration has basically claimed that North Korea is not trustable; 
therefore, North Korea does not deserve the U.S. commitments pledged by the Clinton 
administration. North Korea has proven to be a greedy state, so, they concluded, 
cooperation with North Koreans means appeasement. Thus, North Korea should either be 
contained by multilateral diplomacy or deterred by military options. As a result, the Bush 
administration preferred a less cooperative policy towards North Korea. The 
administration wanted to force North Koreans to cooperate not on their terms but on U.S. 
terms. Moreover, the Bush administration repeatedly pointed out North Korea as a 
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possible target of the preemption concept and displayed readiness for military options on 
several occasions as well. Linking these policies to the hardships of implementing the 
Agreed Framework, North Koreans seem to have perceived the Bush administration’s 
actions as a scenario to deny U.S. commitments and as a prelude before a preemptive 
strike. 
According to Daniel Pinkston, some people in the Bush administration had 
opposed the Clinton administration’s approach to North Korea before Bush was 
inaugurated, and these people were looking forward to scrapping the Agreed Framework. 
When they assumed their position in government, Pinkston claims, it was a good 
opportunity for them to accomplish that goal.143 Another fact about the Bush 
administration is that prominent officials had indicated their intention for more severe 
foreign policy options toward rouge countries long before they took office. For example, 
Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, Richard Perle, and Richard L. Armitage     
were among those who wrote a letter to President Clinton urging him to act decisively 
against threats and “to turn [his] administration's attention to implementing a strategy for 
removing Saddam's regime from power. This [would] require a full complement of 
diplomatic, political and military efforts.”144  
This mindset appears to have continued after they came to power. They believed 
the United States should adapt itself to the new security environment with a more 
proactive strategy. The terrorist attacks of September 11 vindicated them by revealing 
that the homeland of the United States could easily be threatened. In order to defend the 
country more effectively threats should be eliminated before they fully materialize. As a 
result, they devised a proactive security strategy based on prevention and preemption 
concepts. Many arguments took place after the announcement of the new strategy. The 
emphasis on preemption has been criticized for providing incentive to targeted countries 
to get more prepared militarily to defend themselves. Whether these arguments are 
reasonable or not, at least North Korea justified its behaviors by citing the preemption 
concept.  
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The new U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes the concern that the actors 
who pose current threats will not provide warning before they hit, so the threat should be 
eliminated before it fully materializes. Thus, while preserving the deterrence and 
containment strategies of the Cold War era, the new strategy underlines the need to be 
more proactive against contemporary threats. The emphasis on the preemption concept to 
deal with the contemporary threats is clearly stated in Chapter V of the new strategy: 
“The United States must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before 
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction.”145  
According to the Bush administration, pursuing a proactive strategy is reasonable 
because the Cold War is over, the threat environment has changed remarkably, it is 
harder to deter enemies who have no country to defend, and containment is not possible 
when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction and are prepared to share them with 
terrorists.146 The Bush administration insists that there is little or no time to react against 
the new threats if they are allowed to materialize. The United States might not obtain a 
warning before an attack; therefore, threats should be eliminated beforehand to provide 
more security for the country.  
In addition to the emphasis on preemption, there is an uncertainty concerning the 
scope of the new strategy. Some statements in the new strategy are subject to wide 
interpretation. For example, after explaining how legal scholars and international jurists 
often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat, 
the strategy proposes that the United States must adapt the concept of imminent threat to 
the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.147 This proposition can be 
interpreted in a broad spectrum that may agitate many countries including North Korea. 
Therefore, it is easy for North Korea to think the United States would prefer to eliminate 
its military capabilities or remove the existing regime if it perceives those as imminent 
threats to the security concerns of the United States. In order to defend the United States 
more effectively, transforming the security strategy into a more proactive one seems 
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reasonable. However, the United States is not the only country that needs security. 
Targeted states also need to defend their interests. Although the new strategy states that 
“the United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should 
nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression,”148 the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 
explicitly named North Korea as a possible target for U.S. nuclear weapons. Thus, North 
Korea has sufficient reasons to feel insecure.   
2. The Interpretation of North Korea’s Behavior  
The North Koreans have basically asked the United States to agree to three things 
in exchange for accepting more international control on their nuclear program: (1) to 
promise not to invade North Korea by signing a non-aggression treaty, (2) to lift the 
sanctions and not to block its economic development, and (3) to normalize relations. 
Since the North Koreans regard the consequences of economic and political isolation as a 
direct threat to their existence, they tend to consider their isolation as one of their security 
concerns.  That is, the North Koreans want to solve all their problems before renouncing 
their nuclear weapons production capability, and this makes them prone to be 
misperceived. Although the United States tries to combine several issues to agree to 
cooperate with North Korea in a similar way, it nevertheless interprets North Korea’s 
behavior as blackmail, and it considers North Korea a greedy state. What North Koreans 
want in reality is, according to the Bush administration, to use their nuclear weapons 
program as a leverage to achieve political and economic objectives. Therefore, the United 
States should show its resolve, as in the deterrence model, to prevent North Korea from 
going further. When the North Koreans see that they could not take advantage of U.S. 
goodwill, they will give up expecting further concessions and quit leveraging their 
nuclear weapons program. The belief that North Koreans are good at taking advantage of 
crises supports this assessment of the administration as well. 
Some experts claim that the North Korean leadership is quite capable of assessing 
costs and benefits while having sophisticated political skills. For example Victor D. Cha 
and David C. Kang say that “Kim Jong Il is as rational and calculating as he is brutal.” 149 
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Some observers point out the strategy that North Korea pursued in nuclear negotiations 
with South Korea and the United States between 1991 and 1993 to demonstrate how 
successfully North Korean leadership used those skills. For example, while reviewing 
these negotiations, Yong-Sup Han states that North Korea employed different strategies 
and tactics against South Korea and the United States to achieve its goals.150 While 
negotiating with South Korea, it adopted a mixed strategy of compromise and toughness 
including insults and slander, propaganda wars, and delay. On the other hand, North 
Korea preferred brinkmanship diplomacy to draw the United States to the negotiation 
table and extract concessions. Yong-Sup Han  claims that in order to conduct that strategy 
against the United States, North Korea created a crisis in the NPT regime; it violated the 
agreement on purpose, and made its previous commitments a negotiation agenda item.151 
This crisis generating diplomacy of North Korea in the 1990s, and the other 
tactics presented in Yong-Sup Han’s study, such as reaching the brink first and 
threatening the counterpart, forcing the United States to the negotiation table, proposing a 
comprehensive deal, blackmailing, dividing issues into pieces and making use of each 
piece, are similar to North Korea’s recent behavior. The smart and greedy nature of North 
Korea’s behavior when negotiating with the Clinton administration suggests that North 
Korea does not ignore the value of its nuclear program as a leverage. From this 
perspective, North Korea looks like the greedy state in the deterrence theory. If this were 
the truth, then North Korea would be exploiting cooperative approaches of the United 
States. The North Koreans, however, appear to be willing to reciprocate U.S. 
concessions, even those which are beyond meeting their expectations. Democratic 
representative Eliot Engel of New York, a member of a congressional delegation that 
visited North Korea in early June 2003, said, "I believe North Korea is willing to end 
their nuclear program for some assurances from the United States that we are not seeking 
regime change there."152 As a matter of fact, the North Koreans have not asked more than 
what was pledged in the Agreed Framework. Therefore, despite the common belief about 
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North Korea’s greediness and past experiences about its negotiation tactics, it is hard to 
claim that North Korea is just trying to leverage its nuclear potential for further 
concessions. 
The North Koreans, moreover, have continuously denied the Bush 
administration’s claims and argued that the Bush administration misinforms the world 
against North Korea while trying to stifle their regime at the same time. The United 
States, they have said, did not give North Korea what it promised in 1994; moreover, the 
Bush administration collapsed the Agreed Framework and planned a preemptive attack 
against North Korea. Therefore, the North Koreans might think that they have the right to 
resume their nuclear program. They might even think that the recent developments 
vindicated their decision to initiate a secret uranium enrichment program several years 
ago, if there is any.  
All in all, although there is some evidence that supports the deterrence model, the 
interactions between the Bush administration and North Korea mostly resemble the spiral 
model. The emphasis on the preemption in the new strategy and the uncertainty of the 
scope of implementation seem to have a clear potential of intimidating North Korea. The 
most recent example of the execution of the new strategy, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
seems to be a contributing factor in North Korea’s increased alertness. On the other hand, 
claiming that only the Bush administration caused the current crisis is not fair since North 
Korea seems to have started its covert uranium enrichment program long before President 
Bush took office. However, the Bush administration’s policies seem to have strengthened 
North Korea’s suspicion and distrust about the U.S. policies while the preemption 
concept appears to have increased their insecurity. As suggested in the spiral model, the 
North Koreans seem ready to forgo their nuclear weapons production capability if their 
security concerns and economic and political needs are addressed properly by the United 
States. Therefore, believing that North Korea is an insecure state seems more reasonable. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
The Bush administration could possibly perceive North Korea as a greedy state 
and consider its security concerns as fabricated pretexts. The administration might also be 
calculating to circumvent the costly obligations of the Agreed Framework. No matter 
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what the real mind set of the Bush administration is, North Koreans seem to perceive 
U.S. policies as a direct threat towards their existence. They appear to be trying to 
prevent the United States from destroying the existing regime in the country. Since they 
linked all military, economic and political threats to each other, North Koreans want the 
United States to address all their concerns together in exchange for renouncing their 
nuclear weapons production potential. This makes it more difficult for them to express 
what they are really afraid of. It also makes it difficult for the outsiders to understand 
what they really want. 
 If the United States displayed its willingness for full cooperation with North 
Korea, and if North Korea did not reciprocate to U.S. goodwill, then it would be 
reasonable to claim that North Korea resembles the greedy state illustrated in the 
deterrence theory. However, given that the implementation of the Agreed Framework has 
not been satisfactory, that the United States has not provided the security assurance 
pledged in the Agreed Framework, and that North Korea had enough evidence to suspect 
the continuity of the cooperative approach of the United States, North Korea’s violation 
seems to be a result of prudence rather than ambitious thinking. Insecurity, which was 
increased by the Bush administration’s security strategies, in general, and their 
uncooperative policies towards North Korea, in particular, appears to be the most 
dominant motive in North Korea’s resuming the nuclear weapons program.  
Getting the United States to better implement the Agreed Framework might be a 
supporting incentive for the North Koreans. Nevertheless, the real factor that caused 
North Korea to resume its nuclear program seems to be the Bush administration’s 
policies and aggressive aspects of the new strategy. North Korea’s behavior resembles 
the reactions of the insecure state illustrated in the spiral model. As the model suggests, 
the Bush administration’s strategy, which apparently ignored North Korea’s security 
concerns, possibly caused a security dilemma provoking North Korea to resume its 
plutonium-based nuclear weapons program. North Korea’s response to recent U.S. 
proposal to provide some form of security guarantee also supports the spiral model. The 
North Koreans initially rejected U.S. offer; however, they later stated that they were 
ready to consider President Bush's remarks on providing written security assurances “…if 
they are based on the intention to co-exist with [North Korea] and aimed to play a 
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positive role in realizing the proposal for a package solution on the principle of 
simultaneous actions.”153  As seen, U.S. willingness for cooperation does not stimulate 
North Korea’s aggressive ambitions; instead, it gets North Korea to act more positively. 
North Korea’s stress on simultaneous action clearly points out the existence of distrust, 
which is one of the main reasons of the security dilemma. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although North Korea engages in some behavior similar to the aggressive state in 
the deterrence theory, it more closely resembles the insecure state in the spiral model. 
North Korea’s positive responses to cooperative approaches addressing its security 
concerns support the idea that its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons are insecurity driven 
reactions. North Korea seems to have perceived U.S. policies as a threat towards its 
existence since its foundation. It still believes that the United States wants to destroy the 
regime; therefore, it resorts to the ultimate deterrent, nuclear weapons, to save the regime.  
Looking at only its massive armed forces, one can think that North Korea’s 
conventional military capability is sufficient for North Korea to deter the United States. 
However, over the past fifteen or twenty years, North Korea’s conventional military 
capability has declined relatively.154 Many people look at the quantity of weapons. But 
the quality of hardware and training has been relatively in decline. Moreover, the decline 
in North Korea’s economic situation and the erosion of their alliance relationships since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union contribute to their sense of insecurity.155 Thus, nuclear 
weapons remain the only credible deterrent against the threats towards the regime.  
B. MISPERCEPTIONS AND MIXED MOTIVES  
The North Koreans link all their military, economic and political concerns to each 
other and want the United States to address all of them together in exchange for 
renouncing their nuclear weapons program. This makes it more difficult for them to 
express what they really afraid of. It also makes it difficult for outsiders to understand 
what the North Koreans really want. When the details of the strategic interactions 
between the United States and North Korea are carefully examined, one can see that 
primary reasons for the confrontations have been mutual distrust and insecurity that have 
been established since the artificial partition of Korea in the late 1940s. Mutual distrust 
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and insecurity has created a security dilemma between the United States and North 
Korea, in which the two states mutually felt threatened by each other’s efforts to increase 
own security. As a result North Korea initiated its nuclear weapons program apparently 
because it perceived the U.S.-South Korean alliance as an offensive nuclear threat to its 
existence. North Korea resisted any international control on its nuclear program mostly 
because it perceived it as a U.S. manipulated threat against its sovereignty. North Korea 
suspended its nuclear program when the Clinton administration addressed its security 
concerns as well as its economic and political problems. However, as revealed after 
October 2002, North Korea probably had initiated a uranium enrichment program 
because of its doubts about the reliability and continuity of U.S. cooperative policies.  
If the United States displayed its willingness for full cooperation with North 
Korea, and if North Korea did not reciprocate such U.S. goodwill, it would be reasonable 
to claim that North Korea resembles the greedy state illustrated in the deterrence theory. 
However, given the reluctance of the United States in fulfilling its commitments 
regarding the Agreed Framework, North Korea’s alleged uranium enrichment program 
seems to be a result of prudence rather than ambitious thinking in the light of its threat 
perception. The Bush administration’s policies appear to have vindicated North Korea’s 
doubts about U.S. cooperation. Additionally the emphasis on the preemption concept 
probably increased North Korea’s insecurity and provoked it to resume its plutonium-
based nuclear weapons program.  
However, with respect to a technically capable country, one should not 
necessarily expect that only strong security concerns could explain its desire for nuclear 
weapons. Michael Mazarr argues that once a state has developed a capacity to produce 
nuclear weapons on a strong motive, it would be easier for that state to find other 
justifications to maintain this capability.156 To start a nuclear weapons program, states 
should have strong motives that overcome the heavy costs of political and economic 
consequences. However, after achieving a certain technical potential, weaker evidences 
and secondary motives supporting the main motive might encourage states to maintain 
their nuclear program. Therefore, the impact of motivations should be assessed 
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differently before and after achieving technical capability for producing nuclear weapons. 
As for the North Korean case, North Korea’s initial motives were products of its security 
concerns, and North Korea still perceives continuity in the nature of threats. Therefore, 
although North Korea has developed other motives over time to maintain its nuclear 
weapons program, North Korea should still be regarded as an insecure state because of its 
main concern, the survival of the regime. 
C. THE STAKES AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES 
The Bush administration might be perceiving North Korea as a greedy state and 
considering its security concerns as fabricated pretexts. The administration might also be 
calculating to avoid the costly obligations of the Agreed Framework. No matter what the 
real mind set of the Bush administration is, North Korea seems to be closer to 
establishing a large nuclear arsenal. According to David Albright’s technical assessment, 
North Korea’s spent fuel contains about 27 kilograms of plutonium, which is enough for 
producing about five nuclear weapons.  If North Korea regularly operates the five-MWe 
reactor at Yongbyon and finishes the constructions of two larger reactors at Yongbyon 
and Taechon in a couple of years, it could produce about 280 kilograms of plutonium per 
year, or enough for about 56 nuclear weapons per year.  If North Korea could establish a 
uranium enrichment plant in the next few years, it could produce enough highly enriched 
uranium for two-three nuclear weapons per year. Therefore, as a mathematical 
possibility, North Korea could produce a total of 8-10 nuclear weapons by the end of 
2005 and over 200 nuclear weapons by the end of 2010.157  
If the United States cannot stop North Korea until the late 2005, it will have not 
only to think about what to do with North Korea’s nuclear weapons but also to think 
about what to do to keep neighboring countries calm and what to do to keep the 
nonproliferation regime alive. If North Korea passes the threshold towards being a 
nuclear weapon state with several weapons it will pose a real threat to regional and global 
security. If North Korea becomes more threatening, Japan may consider obtaining 
nuclear weapons of its own for deterrence, or, as some analysts claim, it may choose to 
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terminate its bilateral defense treaty with the United States to appease its adversaries.158 
Other American allies that enjoy the deterrent umbrella of the U.S. nuclear arsenal also 
might reassess their positions. George Perkovich says, “Yet, South Korea, Germany, and 
Japan today seem more alarmed than reassured by U.S. strategy.”159 The reactions of 
such countries to a nuclear North Korea are critical to the future of the nonproliferation 
regime.   
The Clinton administration’s cooperative approach appeared to be a good policy 
choice since North Korea positively responded to U.S. concessions. Although North 
Korea raised tensions again by conducting long range missile tests in 1998 and by 
allegedly initiating a secret uranium enrichment program in the late 1990s, the 
cooperative approach of the Clinton administration still seems to be the most appropriate 
policy option for that time since it avoided a forthcoming war and froze North Korea’s 
plutonium production capability. The Bush administration should also try to restrict, if 
not stop, the nuclear weapons production capability of North Korea as soon as possible 
by defining a more feasible goal for the short term. A number one priority for the United 
States should be to deal with North Korea’s nuclear potential first. The United States 
does not seem to have the luxury to link all issues and wait for solving all problems with 
North Korea with minimum or no concessions. The United States should avoid putting all 
eggs in the same basket; instead, it should separate its concerns about North Korea’s 
nuclear potential from other issues making North Korea’s compromise easier.  
North Korea’s mixed motives, similarly, make the North Korean crisis 
complicated and hard to resolve. Although North Korea wants nuclear weapons primarily 
to deter the United States, its insistence on political and economic provisions to maximize 
its gains makes North Korea seem like a greedy state. North Korea’s ambition to solve all 
its problems in exchange for renouncing is nuclear weapons program provides U.S. 
hardliners with a valuable opportunity to insist on uncompromising policies. Therefore, 
the U.S. administration should convince North Korea to separate issues as the starting 
point towards solving the problem. The administration should make it clear that if North 
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Korea is sincere about its security concerns, it should not link its political and economic 
demands to its nuclear weapons program. The United States should display its 
willingness to strongly assure North Korea’s security concerns and, then, show its 
readiness to negotiate other items in the future provided North Korea agrees to separate 
its demands.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Since the North Korean case is a time sensitive issue, it is not plausible to try to 
achieve a long-term comprehensive solution. For the short term, acting more 
cooperatively seems to be the most rational course of action. The United States should 
negotiate with North Korea bilaterally in order to better understand what North Korea 
wants. Bilateral dialogue does not mean compromising national-security interests; in fact, 
it might prove useful in restricting North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. 
Some critics, like Henry Sokolsi and Victor Glinsky, think that North Korea 
should pay a price for breaching the NPT.160 They say, if the United States resorts to an 
engagement policy again and North Korea goes without punishment, this will encourage 
other proliferation aspirants. The primary assumption of such critics appears to be that 
North Korea will never forgo its nuclear weapons production capability even if North 
Korea is granted a tangible security assurance. According to such critics, North Korea 
will cheat in any case, because its real goal is to be a nuclear state. Although their 
prediction about the impact of a nuclear North Korea on nonproliferation efforts seems 
undeniable, their proposal for an effective solution of the North Korean crisis does not 
look so plausible. This is because they do not care about North Korea’s motive as much 
as they care about the consequences.  
Avoiding undesirable consequences does not necessarily justify a hardliner stance 
against North Korea because, as Jervis argued, cooperation works better than coercion for 
insecure states. Empirical evidences show that North Korea reciprocates when its major 
concerns are addressed. It cheats; however, it is not fair to say that it cheated although its 
counterpart was in full compliance with its commitments. Given the United State’s poor 
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performance in the implementation of the Agreed Framework and the provoking nature 
of the Bush administration’s approach, North Korea’s attempt does not appear to be pure 
insincerity. Additionally, its attempts to maximize its gains cannot be accused of pure 
greediness. North Korea mostly responded to cooperation positively. Engagement policy 
did not remove all its ambitions for nuclear weapons but restricted them to some degree.  
The Agreed Framework was not the best deal for the United States but it was the 
optimum solution that could be reached at that time. It did not fully stop North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program but it restricted its nuclear ambitions. Despite its weakness 
against cheating or circumventing, engaging North Korea should be considered the best 
option for the time being also because there are two alternatives to this option: either 
watching North Korea enlarge its nuclear arsenal or risking a bloody war. The United 
States can try a better agreement by establishing more feasible goals and by pledging 
more sustainable commitments. Insisting on fully dismantling North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons production capability does not seem feasible since it would require endless 
inspections to verify North Korea’s compliance. Actually, verifying nonexistence is 
almost impossible as seen in the Iraqi case. Even if North Korea agrees to this initially, it 
will eventually complain about U.S. misconduct and try to circumvent its obligations as it 
did before. Therefore, the United States should aim at restricting North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions again. If North Korea’s security concerns can be addressed satisfactorily and if 
North Korea can be integrated to international community successfully, it will possibly 
want to forgo all its nuclear potential voluntarily as some other countries did before. The 
United States can achieve this by providing the security guarantee that North Korea 
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